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ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION
Yang Song, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2015
This dissertation comprises three essays in the economics of education. I use natural and
field experiments to evaluate education policies and programs. I also bring insights from
psychology to understand how to improve learning and work efficiency.
The first chapter shows how a Chinese city was successful in helping its low-performing
schools catch up. The city’s education bureau identified several low-performing middle
schools and guaranteed elite high school admission to their top ten-percent graduates. I
document that schools affected by this top-ten percent policy improved their performance
by 0.3 standard deviation. To understand the underlying mechanisms, the city’s lottery
system for middle school assignment is used to test for changes in composition and value-
added. The study suggests that incentives for better students to attend lower-performing
schools help narrow not only the school performance gap but also the school quality gap.
The second chapter evaluates a peer mentoring program that matches high-performing
students as mentors to their low-performing classmates and provides non-monetary incen-
tives for them to study together and stay in school. We implemented the program in two
rural Chinese middle schools. The program did not improve the mentees’ math scores,
but instead increased their learning stress. However, the program did significantly improve
the mentors’ math scores by 0.57 standard deviations and lowered their dropout rate by
3%, with no impact on their mental health scores. We discuss possible reasons for these
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surprising results and propose changes in program design that may help mentees benefit
as well.
The third chapter studies the effect of time abundance on work efficiency. I propose a
strategic framework of efficient completion of time-constrained tasks. Facing a task with
a deadline, an agent is under-motivated when there is abundant time and over-motivated
when the deadline is too close. This generates a hump-shaped relationship between effi-
ciency and time available for the task. I use online homework tracking data for a large
introductory microeconomics class to test this theory. Within-subject analysis provides
evidence supporting the predictions: when a student starts work neither too early nor too
late, he/she has a higher class ranking and a lower time cost.
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1.0 SORTING, SCHOOL PERFORMANCE AND SCHOOL QUALITY:
EVIDENCE FROM CHINA
1.1 INTRODUCTION
School choice policies including vouchers and lotteries have been widely adopted in many
countries. The underlying idea is that these policies give students and parents more freedom
in choosing schools, and schools are under more pressure to improve quality to attract
students. However, these school-choice policies have had mixed results and, somewhat
problematically, have in some cases increased sorting.1 When given choices, students with
low socioeconomic status (SES) are less likely to choose a good school (Ajayi, 2011; Walters,
2013).2 Theoretical and empirical evidence shows that students with high SES and high
ability sort out of low-performing schools, leaving disadvantaged students behind (Epple
and Romano, 1998; Levin, 1998; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006; Galiani et al., 2008; Chakrabarti,
2009).3 Given the importance of peer composition in the education production function
1See Hoxby (2000); Bettinger (2005); Rothstein (2007); Chakrabarti (2008) for mixed results on effects
of introducing school choice and increased school competition; see Rouse and Barrow (2009); MacLeod
and Urquiola (n.d.) for reviews. A large literature on the impacts of winning a school lottery or school
voucher have also found mixed results in various locations, like Milwaukee, Columbia, New York, Chicago,
Charlotte-Mecklenburg and China. See Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2011); Angrist et al. (2002); Dobbie and
Fryer (2011); Angrist et al. (2013b); Cullen et al. (2006); Deming (2011); Deming et al. (2014); Krueger and
Zhu (2004); Peterson et al. (1998); Rouse (1998); Rouse and Barrow (2009); Witte (1997); Zhang (2012).
2See Hoxby and Avery (2013) for similar patterns on selective college applications.
3Levin (1998) reviews empirical evidence on voucher programs and find consistent results that school
choice leads to greater SES and racial segregation. See Hoxby and Avery (2013) for similar patterns on
selective college applications. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2013) found no negative spillover effect of
private school vouchers on students staying in public schools.
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(Epple and Romano, 2011), this sorting pattern may lead to more inequality (Epple and
Romano, 1998; Calabrese et al., 2012). How to change sorting given choices so as to close
the performance gaps is still an open question.
This study evaluates a policy that provides incentive for high ability students to vol-
untarily enroll in low-performing schools under a choice-based lottery school assignment
system. Changsha, a Chinese provincial capital city with a population of seven million, in-
troduced the top ten-percent quota policy in 2007. The education bureau chose one or two
low-performing public middle schools in each district and guaranteed admission to an elite
high school for the top 10% of 9th grade graduates from each of these schools. This paper
answers two questions: Did the Top 10% Quota Policy narrow the school performance gap?
And if so, what are the underlying mechanisms?
To estimate the policy impact, I employ a difference-in-differences identification strategy
with a panel data set of middle school graduation exam performance from 2004 to 2011. I
show that the policy schools improved their average performances by around 0.3 standard
deviations in the middle school graduation exam and increased their elite high school
attendance rates by around six percent.
This impact could be working through various possible mechanisms, including a compo-
sition effect, a tournament effect, and a peer effect. First, a conceptual framework in section
5 illustrates the trade-offs on whether to change enrollment choice from an over-subscribed
school to a low-performing policy school. It predicts that above average students who are
not at the top of the talent distribution are most likely to switch to low-performing pol-
icy schools.4 Second, competition to place at the top ten-percent may stimulate a higher
effort level exerted by students, especially the top-performing ones. Third, with better
peer groups and a more active learning environment, it may bring positive spill-over effects
on non-switchers: students who chose an over-subscribed school but lost the lottery and
4Benefit from switching occurs when a student has a higher probability of making it into the top ten-
percent of a low-performing school than that of making it into the top thirty-percent among all students in
the city; cost is having lower quality peers.
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students who would have chosen these low-performing schools anyway. The first channel
redistribute students across schools; the latter two channels increase the value-added at
the policy schools.
To tease out the mechanisms, I exploit Changsha’s preference-based lottery middle
school assignment. Since 1996, the Changsha education bureau has assigned a fixed number
of seats in several neighborhood public middle schools to each elementary school every
year. A sixth grade student chooses one from the short list of middle schools assigned to
his/her elementary school.5 In cases of over-enrollment, a lottery takes place and randomly
assigns winners to their chosen school and losers to the under-subscribed low-performing
school, some of which were assigned the top ten-percent quotas. This allows me to analyze
changes in students’ school choices and compare the outcomes of lottery winners with
those of lottery losers to obtain unambiguous results on the value-added gap between
policy schools and over-subscribed schools.
Observing the school choices by sixth graders, I compare the baseline performance of
students who voluntarily chose the policy schools before and after the policy. I found that
sixth graders with high math scores and high SES were more likely to choose a policy
school after the policy. In particular, students with high, but not the highest, sixth grade
math scores changed their school choice to policy schools after the policy introduction.
This result is consistent with predictions from the conceptual framework.
Using lottery assignment as the instrument variable, I estimate the local average treat-
ment effect (LATE) of attending a policy school before and after the introduction of the
top ten-percent quota policy. Estimates show that policy school attendance caused a 0.3
standard deviation decrease in academic performance of lottery losers before the policy;
this value-added gap was closed after the policy. With better peer quality, policy schools
may improve their value-added for all students; extra effort to place at the top ten-percent
brings a tournament effect only for the high-performing students. To estimate heteroge-
5In China, elementary school goes from first to sixth grade and middle school goes from seventh to ninth
grade.
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neous effects, I conduct instrumental variable quantile treatment effect (QTE) analysis
(Abadie et al., 2002) to test how the policy changed the distribution of value-added gap.
Results shows that before the policy, the value-added gap was negative for most deciles
across the distribution, and more so for high-performing students. After the policy, the
value-added gaps were closed for most of the deciles, except for the sixtieth and nineti-
eth percentile. Since students at low quantiles would only be subject to changes in peer
effects but not tournament effects, improvements on value-added at low deciles suggest
that peer effects are at work. The policy closed not only the performance gap but also
the value-added gap between the low-performing policy schools and the over-subscribed
schools.
This study has some implications on recent school choice reform. Attending private
or charter schools sometimes brings academic and/or nonacademic benefits to the lottery
winners.6 However, school choice reforms may increase sorting and may widen the perfor-
mance gap (Epple and Romano, 1998; Levin, 1998; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006; Calabrese
et al., 2012; Galiani et al., 2008; Chakrabarti, 2009). Similar with previous studies (Ajayi,
2011; Butler et al., 2013; Hastings et al., 2008; Hoxby and Avery, 2013; Walters, 2013),
I find that students with lower SES are less likely to choose an over-subscribed school.
Previous research attempted to improve school choice by providing information for parents
and students and found that it helps in some cases, but not in others.7
Aside from efforts to help disadvantaged students choose and attend better schools,
many studies have also looked more directly on how to improve the quality of low-performing
schools. Angrist et al. (2013a) and Dobbie and Fryer (2013) found that the “No Excuses”
model of urban education is the key to charter school effectiveness. In the case of the
top ten-percent quota policy, combining school choice with incentives for good students to
6A large literature has looked at the effect of attending a chosen school in a lottery setting and has
found mixed evidence (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2011; Angrist et al., 2002; Dobbie and Fryer, 2011; Angrist
et al., 2013b; Cullen et al., 2006; Deming, 2011; Deming et al., 2014; Krueger and Zhu, 2004; Peterson et
al., 1998; Rouse, 1998; Rouse and Barrow, 2009; Witte, 1997).
7Positive effects of providing information were found in Chicago and Pakistan(Hastings and Weinstein,
2008; Andrabi et al., 2009), but not in India or Chile (Banerjee et al., 2010; Mizala and Urquiola, 2013).
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attend lower-performing schools helps change the sorting patterns and narrow the perfor-
mance gap. More importantly, instrumental QTE results show that the value-added gap
is also closed almost everywhere across the distribution, which suggests that positive peer
effects brought on by the composition changes are at work.
This study also relates to how relative evaluation changes sorting. A similar policy
in the U.S. is the top x-percent rule in Texas, California and Florida, which guarantees
flagship state university admission for top x-percent of seniors in all high schools. These
policies and Changsha’s policy differ in the school level (middle school v.s. high school), in
the affected schools (some low-performing schools v.s. all schools) and most importantly,
in their purposes. Changsha introduced the top ten-percent quota policy to improve low-
performing schools by changing composition and improving school quality collectively, while
top x% in the U.S. mainly aims at improving the minority students representation in
selective colleges after the affirmative action ban (Long, 2004; Long et al., 2010). Therefore,
while sorting emerges in both cases, change in sorting was unintended in Texas (Cullen et
al., 2013), but it was expected and beneficial in the case of Changsha.
Results here on the top ten-percent quota policy complement previous findings on the
Texas Ten-Percent Law. Cullen et al. (2013) and this study provide converging evidence
that relative evaluation brings different sorting behaviors and improves student composition
in low-performing schools. Although the top x-percent rule fails to promote the opportunity
of minority groups as well as the affirmative action (Long, 2004; Long et al., 2010), it helps
low-performing high schools to improve their performance faster than other schools (Cortes
and Zhang, 2011). I also find that in the case of Changsha, policy schools caught up in their
performance. Further, this study advances previous studies by estimating the value-added
gap before and after the policy, exploiting Changsha’s unique lottery school assignment.
Results show that the school quality gap was closed as well. To what extent these results
would apply to environments with large variations in racial composition and instructions
is unknown.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background on
the top ten-percent quota policy and choice-based lottery middle school assignment. Sec-
tion 3 describes data construction, and thus why and how I use the data to conduct the
analysis. Section 4 evaluates the policy impact on school performances using a difference-
in-differences framework. Section 5 provides a conceptual framework on school choice and
exploits the preference-based lottery middle school assignment to tease out changes in
composition and in value-added. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 POLICY BACKGROUNDD
Although China has experienced rapid economic growth in the past few decades, enlarging
inequality has brought pressing social problems. School choice is an especially controversial
topic. Differences in education quality and academic performance across schools have been
widened, both within and across cities. Students bear heavy pressure to compete for access
to good schools and avoid bad schools, starting from a very early age. Lump-sum fees for
high quality schools and an increasingly large and expensive tutoring industry put students
with low SES in worse situations. To alleviate these problems and improve equal education
opportunities, governments from the central to local level have been implementing various
policies to equalize school quality and education opportunities for students. One of such
policies is Changsha’s top ten-percent quota policy.
1.2.1 Top Ten-Percent Quota Policy
Changsha is a provincial capital city in South-central China, with a population of about
seven million. While there are several rural districts/counties in the city, the top ten-
6
percent quota policy only relates to the five urban districts.8 At the elementary school
level in these urban districts, there are around 18,000 students in each cohort and about
240 schools; at the middle school level, there are around 20,000 students in each cohort and
about 75 schools. Elementary schools run from first until sixth grade, middle schools run
from seventh until ninth grade, and high schools run from tenth until twelfth grade. At
the end of their ninth grade, students take the Middle School Graduation Exam (MSGE),
which determines high school admissions.
Middle schools with better past MSGE performances carry better reputations of school
quality and attract students with better academic performance and higher socioeconomic
status. Large performance gaps intensify sorting by ability across schools. In 2007, Chang-
sha’s education bureau initiated and announced the top ten-percent quota policy.9 One or
two low-performing middle schools in each district were chosen to pair with an elite high
school. Six middle schools were originally assigned the quota since 2007 and five more were
added in 2008. Altogether, these 11 policy schools have around 3,000 students per cohort,
about 14% of the total middle school student population in the city. As of the writing of
this paper, the policy is still operating.
For each paired group of a low-performing middle school and an elite high school, the
top Ten-Percent 9th grade graduates from the middle school every year are guaranteed
to be admitted into the elite high school, without taking the MSGE at the end of 9th
grade and competing with all other graduates. Although the top ten-percent ranking
method is decided by individual middle schools and varies slightly, they all basically use
accumulated performance across subjects throughout the three years in middle school.
To be eligible to compete for the top ten-percent, students are required to be admitted
through the preference-based lottery and attend the school from 7th grade onward. These
requirements rule out possibility of late-term transfers.
8The district description of urban and rural here is from a Chinese perspective. Urban areas are more
developed and populated and typically have better schools.
9The project is called “dui kou zhi sheng” in Chinese pinyin, which literally translates to “pair-wise
direct admission”.
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The main goals of the Top Ten-Percent Policy are to change sorting, narrow perfor-
mance gap between middle schools and provide better education for students attending
the lower-performing middle schools. More equalized performance across middle schools
eases the concern of parents and lower the incentive of sorting. Parents would not worry
as much if they send their children to a slightly lower-performing school since peer qual-
ity and chances to attend a good high school would now be higher. Students from low
SES families who attend a lower-performing school would still get comparable value-added
during middle school.
1.2.2 Preference-based Lottery Middle School Assignment
The unique preference-based lottery middle school assignment in Changsha allows me to
tease out the mechanisms. Since 1996, Changsha introduced the preference-based lottery
middle school assignment. Each elementary school is assigned a fixed number of seats
in two or three neighboring middle schools for its graduates (i.e. sixth graders). Each
sixth grader can only choose one middle school. If a middle school is over-enrolled from a
particular elementary school, a lottery takes place and assigns winners to the chosen middle
school and losers to a school that has unfilled seats for that elementary school. Lottery
losers will be assigned randomly to one of the under-subscribed middle schools if there are
more than one of them.
Before the lottery, part of students get pre-admitted to several designated schools with
specialized training in art, music, dance, athletics, or foreign languages. Official rules
forbid other middle schools to pre-admit students by organizing selection exams. They
also require all students to obey the preference-based lottery middle school assignment. I
find that students who were pre-admitted or participated in the lottery and chose a high-
reputation school have better family background and better academic performance than
those who chose a low-performing school.
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1.3 DATA
Through the generous cooperation of local officials, I was allowed access to restrictive
administrative data sets. Figure 1.1 illustrates the time line of policy introduction and
data availability for different years. Individual level 9th grade Middle School Graduation
Exam (MSGE) scores were available for eight cohorts, who entered into middle school
through 2001 to 2008 and graduated three years later through 2004 to 2011. For the latter
four cohorts, I have the lottery middle school assignment records, which happened in 2005
through 2008. In addition, I collected elementary school graduation exam scores from one
school district for the last two cohorts. I also observe students’ gender, ethnicity, city
residency (hukou) and parental political affiliation for the last two cohorts.
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Figure 1.1: Timeline of Policy Announcement and Data Availability for Different Cohorts
Notes: Data is available on the eight cohorts (2001-2004 cohort means they graduated from
elementary schools in 2001 as a sixth grader and finished middle school in 2004 three years later
as a ninth grader). For each cohort, the colors of each bar indicate data availability of three
records: light blue for “not available” and dark blue for “available”; from left to right these three
bars refer to 6th grade score, lottery record and 9th grade score. The red vertical line indicates
that six and five policy schools were announced in 2007 and 2008 respectively.
Only observing sixth grade baseline scores for 2007 and 2008 in Yuhua district is the
reason why I conduct analysis on quality change in composition for the 2008 policy school
in this district. To verify the representativeness of the results, I ran regressions of average
performance as the dependent variable on interaction between dummies for policy and for
Yuhua district. The coefficient for interaction term is insignificant, which suggests that
comparison between policy schools and other schools in Yuhua district is similar with that
in other districts. In a separate regression, coefficient for the triple interaction of three
dummies (policy, Yuhua district and post-policy) is also insignificant, which indicates that
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the policy treatment effect is no different in Yuhua district than the other districts.10
Looking at students’ school choice reveals sorting patterns. Table 1.2 shows the sum-
mary statistics for 2007-2010 cohort. Pre-admitted students have significantly higher base-
line scores and better socioeconomic status than those going through preference-based
lottery school assignment. Among those students going through the normal procedure of
the preference-based lottery school assignment, students choosing over-subscribed schools
have higher baseline scores and better socioeconomic status. This echos with recent lit-
erature showing that students from low socioeconomic background are unlikely to choose
high-quality schools across many settings (Ajayi (2011); Butler et al. (2013); Hastings et
al. (2008), Hoxby and Avery (2013)).
The main outcome variables in this paper are the 9th grade MSGE scores and elite
high school attendance. The exam is high-stake since its score is the only criteria for high
schools to select students 11. Notice that after the policy, the top ten-percent of students
in the policy impacted schools get direct admission to the elite high school without taking
the MSGE.
The MSGE final grade is consist of 6 parts, including Chinese, math, English, social
science (history and politics), science (physics and chemistry), integrated subjects (biology,
geography, physical education). In 2004 and 2005, final grade were in scores and high
schools admissions followed a clear score cutoff. Since 2006, the education bureau changed
from actual scores to letter grades A-E, with A being the highest grade and E the lowest.12
The letter grades are determined by the percentile of student performance in each subject:
top 25% gets an A, the next 35%, 20% and 10% gets a B,C and D respectively, and the
10Results are available upon request.
11Few exceptional students get directly admitted because of the quota policy, athletic or music specialties,
or exceptional academic excellence. Proportion of students who get directly admitted through channels
other than quota policy did not change.
12The transition in grading scale might be the reason why 9th grade scores in 2006 are significantly lower
than other years. Since the grading scale change equally influences students in policy schools and other
schools, it does not affect the analysis of this study. I tested the effect of grading scale change on students’
relative ranking in the city using 2004 and 2005 data and found that students in policy schools do not
experience different change in ranking than other schools.
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bottom 10% gets a failing grade E. High schools admit students based on letter grades and
prefer higher and more balanced grades. For example, four A’s and two B’s is preferred to
five A’s and one C. In the analysis, letter grades A to E are treated as the average percentile
of that grade, i.e. 0.875, 0.575, 0.275, 0.1, 0.05. The highest score is 0.875*6=5.25 (all 6
subjects are As) and lowest is 0.3. To make the grades comparable before and after the
grading scale change, I assign letter grades to each student for each subject in 2004 and
2005 by calculating the percentile category they are in, and then adding up a total score.
I use the panel of 9th grade MSGE performance to estimate the impact of the policy
on the treated middle schools. The number of schools and students and characteristics of
all schools and policy schools are presented in Table 1.1. Earlier years have more missing
data than later years. Altogether, the eleven policy schools have around 3,000 students
per cohort, which is about 14% of all students in the city. Comparing the last two columns
across both panels, we can see that policy schools have lower 9th grade scores and lower
elite high school attendance rate than other schools across all years.
To evaluate the change in quality of composition, I merge 6th grade baseline records in
one district with lottery records for 2007-2010 and 2008-2011 cohorts. The matching rate is
higher than 90%.13 In a separate merge, I match the lottery records in 2005 through 2007
with corresponding MSGE records in 2008 through 2010. 14 The matching rate is higher
than 70% across these cohorts. More details on these merges and data set construction
can be found in Appendix .
13Non-perfect matching rate might due to changing names, typing errors in data, transferring, moving
out of the city, etc..
14The reason why I do not include 2008-2011 cohort in the lottery analysis is because in 2008, there is a
change in the lottery school choice mechanism. Private schools were included in the choice set. Since then,
there were two stages of lotteries, first for private schools and then for public schools. One needs to make
four choices, one public schools, one private schools, whether to go on to public school lottery if win the
private lottery, and whether to go on if lose.
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Table 1.1: Administrative Panel Data Description
Entire Sample
year # schools # students % no missing
score
avrg # stu
per school
% female 9th grade
score
% elite
high
school
2004 94 24,007 90.14% 254.39 51.12% 18.70 25.38%
2005 61 21,062 80.83% 344.28 47.15% 18.65 25.21%
2006 61 16,014 92.18% 261.52 47.37% 15.90 26.41%
2007 65 16,120 88.61% 247.00 47.84% 17.93 26.74%
2008 72 16,967 100.00% 234.65 47.21% 18.28 29.85%
2009 72 24,763 83.38% 342.93 47.13% 18.14 30.21%
2010 73 25,580 87.05% 349.41 46.78% 18.27 30.23%
2011 69 25,296 93.22% 365.61 48.44% 18.62 24.77%
Policy Schools
year # schools # students % no missing
score
avrg # stu
per school
% female 9th grade
score
% elite
high
school
2004 11 2,989 69.42% 270.73 51.56% 17.51 12.10%
2005 7 1,862 87.49% 265.00 48.91% 16.35 5.98%
2006 9 2,109 95.26% 233.33 45.63% 13.81 9.06%
2007 9 1,964 92.31% 217.22 47.17% 16.03 18.77%
2008 11 2,023 100.00% 182.91 48.44% 16.26 22.70%
2009 10 3,100 71.77% 309.00 45.48% 17.25 19.85%
2010 10 3,025 76.10% 301.50 46.35% 17.40 23.01%
2011 10 2,398 91.03% 238.80 49.17% 17.47 18.99%
Note: The table shows the number of schools and students I observe in the administrative data set. There
are 11 policy schools in total. Elite high school attendance is available for year 2009 to 2011, and I impute it
for the other years by computing the percentage of students with a score higher than the seventieth percentile
in the 9th grade graduation exam.
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Table 1.2: Individual Level Data: Summary Statistics 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample All policy pre-admitted oversubscribed lottery
schools lottery &policy
Academic performance
9th grade score 22.73 21.68 24.71 21.60 21.55
normalized 9th grade score 0.758 0.723 0.824 0.720 0.718
% passing grade 0.795 0.763 0.876 0.766 0.767
% academic high school 0.782 0.679 0.935 0.734 0.706
% elite high school 0.332 0.299 0.529 0.201 0.249
non-academic evaluation 19.13 18.82 19.55 18.94 18.97
imputed 9th grade score 22.78 21.93 24.75 21.65 21.69
Family background
% female 0.476 0.463 0.481 0.469 0.477
% with city hukou 0.713 0.650 0.832 0.655 0.617
% missing hukou status 0.0642 0.0681 0.0478 0.0664 0.0457
father political 0.239 0.0924 0.454 0.131 0.103
% missing father’s political 0.332 0.274 0.346 0.272 0.207
mother political 0.119 0.0209 0.256 0.0469 0.0266
% missing mother’s political 0.360 0.294 0.388 0.284 0.216
Middle school admission
pre-admission 0.388 0.00345 1 0 0
over-subscribed lottery 0.286 0.497 0 1 1
policy school 0.138 1 0.00123 0.240 1
Observations 14,699 2,027 5,709 4,199 1,007
Note: Column 2 describes policy school students, column 3 describes students who were pre-admitted, column 4 describes
students who chose an over-subscribed school and assigned by lottery; column 5 describes students who were assigned by
lottery to a policy school. % academic high school indicates the percentage of 9th grade graduates attending an academic
high school; some other graduates attend vocational schools or stop going to schools. Non-academic evaluation consists of
teacher and self-rated measures of four abilities, including civics, learning ability, atheistic ability, and practical ability.
Imputed 9th grade score is constructed by assigning the highest grade of their cohort to the missing grade of direct
admitted students who did not take the exam. Having city hukou means that a student is born in a city and enjoys the
public goods of that city; it is often used as a measure of socioeconomic background. Father and mother political is a
dummy that equals one if the parent is affiliated with any party; parental party affiliation is an indicator of better family
background.
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1.4 DOES THE TOP TEN-PERCENT QUOTA POLICY WORK?
1.4.1 Comparisons of Trends in Performance
To look at the overall trend in the school performances, I plot the MSGE average scores
of the treatment group (policy schools) and that of the control group across years. The
exercise is done on three samples: all schools, low-performing schools and a balanced
sample. For each sample, the numbers of schools in the treatment and control groups
are (11, 93), (11, 37) and (2,20). The entire panel data set has 11 policy schools and
93 other schools.15 Low-performing schools are defined as schools with average 9th grade
score below average in 2004.16 The balanced sample includes 2 policy schools and 20 other
schools, which have MSGE scores records for 2004 through 2011.
15The sum is larger than the number of schools in any year, because some schools were shut down or
merged into other schools and some schools were opened in later years.
16Five policy schools did not have data on MSGE scores in 2004, and I assign them to the low-performing
schools sample. The fact that they are low-performing is verified by comparing the performance of these
five schools with other six policy schools.
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Figure 1.2: Normalized 9th Grade Scores: Policy Schools and Other Schools
Notes: Two vertical lines in each figure indicate the timing of the policy change, 2007 and 2008. Three
figures differ in the sample they use to plot the scatter and linear fitted lines. The top figure compares the
average academic performance of policy schools with all other schools from 2004 to 2011. The middle
figure takes low-performing schools with average 9th grade score below medium in 2004 and plots their
performances across different years. The bottom figure only uses schools with complete data for each year.
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Figure 1.2 shows three sets of comparisons of normalized 9th grade scores for policy
schools and the control schools, before and after the introduction of the policy. Each
includes scatter plots of group averages and linear fitted lines. Two vertical lines in each
figure indicate the timing of the policy change. Three figures differ in the sample they use
to plot the scatter and linear fitted lines as defined in the previous paragraph. The top
figure uses the entire sample. Before the policy, the performance gap between policy schools
and other schools is around 0.5 standard deviations; after the policy, the performance gap
was gradually closed.
The middle figure uses only the low-performing schools to make the comparison. Before
the introduction of top ten-percent quota policy in 2007, policy schools’ average academic
performances were slightly higher than other low-performing schools; both sets of schools
performed below average with normalized standardized scores at around -0.6 -0.5 and had
an improving trend. After that, the policy schools improved more rapidly and increased
their average scores to above average, while the other low-performing schools improved
slightly but still had normalized average performance at around -0.5.
The bottom figure uses the balanced sample. Since previous years have more occur-
rences of missing data, we may worry if data is missing for policy schools when they
coincidentally performed well or bad in that pre-policy year, which would bias the treat-
ment effect upward or downward. The balanced sample only includes 22 schools and may
not give us the accurate estimates of the impact. Therefore, using this sample serves as a
robustness check to make sure the main results are not due to accidental biases from an
unbalanced panel. For the schools with no missing data, before 2007 policy schools had a
slight improving trend; after 2007 they made a parallel movement upward by around 0.5
standard deviations and ended at around average score.
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1.4.2 Test for Selection in Treatment Status
Not all low-performing schools received the treatment of the top ten-percent quota policy.17
This is a result of negotiation between the education bureau and the elite high schools.
Elite high schools were only willing to set aside a limited number of seats for unconditional
acceptance of top Ten-Percent students from low-performing schools.
To verify that the policy schools were not chosen based on observed characteristics, I
run a set of probit regressions to test whether pre-policy characteristics can predict policy
treatment status.
D[policy]j = αj + α1Xj + jt (1.1)
D[policy]j is a dummy variable for policy treatment status. It is separately defined by
whether a school is treated by the Top Ten-Percent Policy in 2007, in 2008 or in either
year. Xj represents a set of pre-policy characteristics, including normalized MSGE average
performances, normalized school rankings, female percentages, and numbers of students.
Marginal effects are reported in Table 1.3. First, I run the analysis for all schools and
report the results in column (1)-(3). None of the coefficients are statistically different from
zero, which indicates that observed school characteristics fail to predict the assignment of
the top ten-percent quota policy. To obtain a more concise decision faced by education
bureau and elite high schools, I then restrict the sample to only low-performing schools.
Column (4)-(6) reports the results. All observed school characteristics still fail to predict
treatment status.
This exercise tests for selection on the observed school characteristics and fails to find
any. If the education bureau assigned quotas to the policy schools in 2007 because these
schools would grow faster after 2007 for unobserved reasons, regardless of the top ten-
percent quota policy, the results would be biased. However, given the objective of equalizing
school performance, the education bureau would not have chosen these schools if they were
17Recall from the policy background section that six schools have been treated since 2007 and five other
schools since 2008.
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Table 1.3: Test for Treatment Status Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All Schools Low Performing Schools
Dependent Variable 2007 Policy 2008 Policy Any Policy 2007 Policy 2008 Policy Any Policy
normalized MSGE score -0.0334 -0.0261 -0.0559 -0.0191 -0.000592 -0.0196
(0.0447) (0.0411) (0.0575) (0.0799) (0.0591) (0.0956)
number of students 1.62e-05 3.21e-05 5.60e-05 3.90e-06 -2.31e-06 -1.72e-05
(0.000103) (7.97e-05) (0.000121) (0.000179) (0.000138) (0.000217)
percent female 0.343 0.0190 0.374 0.529 -0.0280 0.532
(0.253) (0.250) (0.339) (0.432) (0.349) (0.524)
normalized ranking -0.169 -0.00633 -0.170 -0.0726 0.0506 -0.0261
(0.110) (0.0975) (0.135) (0.214) (0.160) (0.257)
Obs (School by year) 208 208 208 100 100 100
Pseudo R2 0.157 0.0144 0.0865 0.0303 0.00397 0.0132
This table reports probit regression results, testing for whether pre-policy school characteristics can predict
policy treatment status. Dependent variables are indicators for whether a school is treated by the Top
Ten-Percent Policy in 2007, in 2008 or in either year. The sample used for column (1)-(3) is all observations
in the year 2004, 2005 and 2006; the sample used for column (4)-(6) is low-performing schools in those three
years. Marginal effects and standard errors in parentheses are reported, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All these characteristics fail to predict treatment status.
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already improving by themselves. Instead, they would have chosen other schools that
needed help. Therefore, it is implausible that the policy schools were assigned treatment
based on observed or unobserved characteristics.
1.4.3 Difference-in-Differences Estimation
In general, the pre-trends of treatment and control groups are parallel in all three plots in
Figure 1.2, which verifies the parallel trend assumption needed for a difference-in-differences
estimation. In addition, pre-policy school characteristics fail to predict treatment status
of a school, which indicates that policy schools were not chosen based on these observable
characteristics and can be deemed as an exogenous shock. To obtain a magnitude of the
impact, I use the following difference-in-differences specification:
Yit = αi + δt + βD(policy)i ∗D(post)t + it (1.2)
Yit stands for school i’s performance measures, including normalized average 9th grade
score, normalized ranking and percentage of students attending elite high schools in year
t. Normalized average 9th grade score has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1
for every year. Normalized ranking is constructed by dividing the school ranking (the
higher the better) with total number of schools that year. I add school fixed effects αi
and year fixed effects δt to control for differences in exams and cohorts across years and
fixed differences between schools. The coefficient of interest is β, which is the impact of
the policy on the outcome variables Yit. The dummy indicator D(policy)i ∗D(post)t takes
value of one when school i had the quota in year t. For the six policy schools assigned the
quota in 2007, this dummy is one for year 2007 onward; for the five policy schools assigned
the quota in 2008, it is one for year 2008 onward; for all other schools, it is zero for all
years. An alternative specification is replacing year fixed effect dummies with a linear time
trend.
For similar reasons explained in the previous subsection, I do the analysis for three
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Table 1.4: Difference-in-differences: Treatment Effect on School Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Depend.Variable Normalized 9th grade score Normalized school ranking % elite high school
Panel A. All Schools
postXpolicyany 0.357*** 0.296** 0.116*** 0.0965** 0.0631*** 0.0695***
(0.120) (0.120) (0.0389) (0.0387) (0.0200) (0.0205)
Observations 556 556 556 556 556 556
R-squared 0.070 0.027 0.064 0.028 0.154 0.066
Number of schools 104 104 104 104 104 104
Panel B. Low-performing Schools
postXpolicyany 0.309** 0.250** 0.0666 0.0517 0.0497*** 0.0601***
(0.124) (0.121) (0.0434) (0.0417) (0.0170) (0.0172)
Observations 275 275 275 275 275 275
R-squared 0.102 0.062 0.108 0.089 0.277 0.184
Number of schools 48 48 48 48 48 48
Panel C. Balanced sample
postXpolicyany 0.939*** 0.875*** 0.327*** 0.305*** 0.0794* 0.0847*
(0.249) (0.261) (0.0815) (0.0846) (0.0425) (0.0451)
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 176
R-squared 0.230 0.106 0.213 0.105 0.246 0.101
Number of schools 22 22 22 22 22 22
School FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y N Y N Y N
Time Trend N Y N Y N Y
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1. The
time span of the school panel data ranges from 2004 to 2011. “postXpolicy” equals one for policy schools
during the years after the initial effective year. Each column has dependent variable listed on top row and
control variables indicated at the bottom three rows. Panel B takes school with lower than average score in
2004; Panel C takes schools with observed performance in all eight years.
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samples. Results are shown in Table 1.4. Panel A, B, and C look at all schools, low-
performing schools and a balanced sample, respectively. Almost all coefficients are positive
and significant. Estimates using the balanced panel are the largest and those using only
low-performing schools are the smallest. Compared with all other schools, policy schools
experienced 0.3 standard deviation improvement in 9th grade school average scores. Their
school ranking also rose by 11 to 15 percentile, which would mean moving up seven to eight
spots among a ranking of around 80 schools. Their elite high school attendance increased
significantly for about 6%. Results do not vary much with year fixed effects or a linear
time trend.
While the interacted dummy variable in Equation 1.2 captures the average treatment
effect on the policy schools, it assumes a one time shift in the performances instead of
gradual changes. The following alternative specification uses years treated instead of binary
indicator and looks at the incremental effect of the policy.
Yit = αi + δt + βTit + it (1.3)
Tit indicates years treated. It takes value of max{0, t − 2006} for 2007 policy schools,
max{0, t−2007} for 2008 policy schools and zero for all other schools. Similarly, I conduct
the analysis on all three samples.
Table 1.5 shows that almost all coefficients are positive and significant. Similar with
patterns in Table 1.4, estimates using balanced panel are the largest and those using only
low-performing schools are the smallest. Compared with all other schools, policy schools
improved by 0.06 standard deviation every year. Their school ranking also rose by 2
percentile each year, which would mean moving up in the ranking by one every year. The
increase in elite high school attendance is around 1.6% every year.
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Table 1.5: Incremental Treatment Effect on School Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Depend.Variable Normalized 9th grade score Normalized school ranking % elite high school
Panel A. All Schools
treat year 0.0646** 0.0663** 0.0232*** 0.0235*** 0.0161*** 0.0168***
(0.0264) (0.0267) (0.00854) (0.00860) (0.00438) (0.00456)
Observations 556 556 556 556 556 556
R-squared 0.064 0.027 0.061 0.030 0.161 0.071
Number of schools 104 104 104 104 104 104
Panel B. Low-performing Schools
treat year 0.0567** 0.0555** 0.0123 0.0118 0.0145*** 0.0149***
(0.0277) (0.0276) (0.00965) (0.00955) (0.00372) (0.00392)
Observations 275 275 275 275 275 275
R-squared 0.094 0.061 0.105 0.089 0.298 0.191
Number of schools 48 48 48 48 48 48
Panel C. Balanced sample
treat year 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.0741*** 0.0741*** 0.0199** 0.0199**
(0.0537) (0.0565) (0.0175) (0.0182) (0.00914) (0.00980)
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 176
R-squared 0.229 0.114 0.221 0.124 0.252 0.104
Number of schools 22 22 22 22 22 22
School FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y N Y N Y N
Time Trend N Y N Y N Y
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level indicated by *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
The time span of the school panel data ranges from 2004 to 2011. “Treat year” equals to zero for all school
year combination where there were no quota policy and equals number of years since quota policy is effective
for policy schools. Each column has dependent variable listed on top row and control variables indicated at
the bottom three rows. Panel B takes school with lower than average score in 2004; Panel C takes schools
with observed performance in all eight years.
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1.4.4 Placebo Test
To verify the treatment effects only exist for the policy schools instead of for any low-
performing schools, I run a falsification test of Equation 1.2 on the panel data without
policy schools, and assign a placebo treatment status to other low-performing schools.
Coefficients of the interaction dummies are reported in the Appendix Table A4. Placebo
treatment effects are statistically insignificant in all except one specification: outcome vari-
able being normalized ranking and controls including school and year fixed effects. This
effect goes away after including a linear time trend, which indicates that the only statisti-
cally significant placebo treatment effect is because of variable construction. Normalized
school ranking is constructed as ranking divided by total number of schools that year,
and total number of schools decreases from 2004 to 2011 overall. Looking back at actual
treatment effect estimates in Table 1.4, including the linear time trend did not change the
results. Therefore, the falsification test suggests that treatment effects only apply to the
policy schools.
1.4.5 Change in Distributions of Academic Performances
I plot the 9th grade score distributions for policy schools and non-policy schools before
and after 2007 in Figure 1.3. Solid lines are for before 2007 and dotted lines are for after
2007; red lines are for policy schools and black ones are for non-policy schools. To see the
change in distributions of policy schools’ normalized 9th grade scores, I compare the dotted
and solid red lines. There is a clear rightward shift of policy schools’ score distribution,
and the Ksmirnov test rejects that two distributions are the same. This means that policy
schools improved their performance. A smaller proportion of students get a normalized
score one standard deviation below mean and more get a score around the average. On
the other hand, the difference between distributions of non-policy schools before and after
2007 is not clear by looking at the two black lines in the graph. To understand the change
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Figure 1.3: General Pattern of Changes in Score Distributions
Notes: The figure plots individual level normalized 9th grade scores for policy schools and
non-policy schools before and after 2007.
in distributions, I run quantile regressions with the following specification:
Yit = α
p
i + δ
p
t + β
pD(policy)i ∗D(post)t + pit (1.4)
where 0 < p < 1 indicates the proportion of the population having scores below the pth
percentile. Estimates for different quantiles are plotted in Figure 1.4, with 95% confidence
intervals around them. The estimates are very volatile, especially for the top percentiles.
This may due to the discrete nature of translated letter grades. For the lower end of the
distribution, there is not much change in the performance; for the middle part, we see
positive changes for some quantiles and insignificant changes for others; for the top end,
estimates are very volatile. It suggests that students at the middle experienced significant
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improvement in their 9th grade performance, while students at the bottom did not. The
story is less clear for the top end of the distribution. The quantile regression results only
show a noisy picture of changes along the distribution and do not offer any insight on
selection and change in school quality.
Figure 1.4: Quantile Regression Estimates
Notes: The figure plots estimates of the interaction term postXpolicy in quantile regressions from
10 percentile to 90 percentile with a 2 percentile increment.
1.5 UNDERLYING MECHANISMS
1.5.1 A Conceptual Framework
I documented in the previous section that the gap between the policy impacted low-
performing middle schools and the others has been shrinking after the policy. The top
26
ten-percent quota policy might work through three interacting channels. First, it increases
the chance to be admitted into a top high school for students attending the policy schools.
Therefore it encourages 6th grade elementary school graduates, especially the high per-
forming ones, to choose the policy impacted schools. I refer to this as a composition effect.
Secondly, if the first channel exists, having better peers may bring a positive effect to stu-
dents attending the policy schools (Ding and Lehrer (2007)). I refer to this as a peer effect.
Thirdly, competition for the top ten-percent within these schools may also help the schools
improve their average performance. I refer to this as a tournament effect. Top-performing
students in these schools could be affected by both peer effects and a tournament effect;
while low-performing students are most likely affected by peer effects but not the tourna-
ment effect, since they know that placing at the top ten-percent is unlikely.
To understand what drives the impact, I modify the theoretical framework from Cullen
et al. (2013) to help illustrate the mechanisms and motivate the empirical tests for changes
in composition. For simplicity, I abstract away from heterogeneous neighborhood charac-
teristics, transportation cost and tuition and assume they are identical. This assumption
is plausible because of the following reasons: the public middle schools one can choose
from are nearby and in the same district; public transportation is cheap and convenient;
this city has rather low crime across all districts; there is little ethnic variation across
neighborhoods; public middle school tuition is regulated (around USD50 per semester).
The decision of school choice by parents is driven by the expected impact schools will
have on their children’s future prospects. In China, graduating from an elite college gives
a high return rate (Li et al. (2012)). Therefore, I set the objective of school choice to
maximize college entrance exam performance, Yij . It depends on student’s innate ability,
ai, learning progress before entering high school, yij , and probability of attending an elite
high school, pij . I assume learning progress in middle school increases with one’s ability
ai, peer quality qj , and school characteristics and learning atmosphere γj . Probability of
attending an elite high school is included because elite high schools have better school
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quality and peers, and a significantly higher percentages of students attending an elite
college.
maxj Yij = Yij(ai, yij(ai, qj , γj), pij(yij)) for j = 1, 2...n (1.5)
Without loss of generality, assume that families face two public middle school choices,
j = 1, 2, and school 1 has a better peer quality q1 > q2, and yi1 < yi2. Suppose that before
the policy, probability of getting into an elite high school is higher in school 1 for student
i, pi1 < pi2. The policy gives school 2 elite high school admission for top ten-percent and
changes pi2(yi2, κi2), where κi2 means the probability of placing at top ten-percent in school
2. Now, for a small set of students, the policy changes the comparison between probability
of attending an elite high school in school 1 and school 2, pi1(yi1) < pi2(yi2, κi2). These
students switch to school 2 when the benefit from higher probability of attending an elite
high school is larger than the cost of having a lower peer quality,
∂Yij
∂pij
>
∂Yij
∂yij
∂yij
∂qj
.
On the other hand, for some top performing students, the probability of getting into
an elite high school is pij(yij) = 1, and they have no incentive to bear cost in downgrading
to school 2 with lower peer quality.
To sum up, the introduction of top ten-percent quota policy changes pij for policy
schools and alter some students’ school choices. This affects policy schools in two dimen-
sions: change in peer composition qj and change in value-added yij caused by change in
peer composition qj and competitive learning atmosphere γj .
1.5.2 Using Lottery Records to Tease Out Mechanisms
Empirically, the lottery middle school assignment provides the opportunity to separately
look at changes in composition and in value-added. Recall that each elementary school
is assigned a certain number of seats to around three nearby middle schools. Each 6th
grader chooses only one middle school. When a middle school gets oversubscribed in that
elementary school, a lottery randomly determines school assignment.
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Policy schools rarely gets oversubscribed in any elementary schools. Therefore, there
are only two types of 6th graders who attend policy middle schools: those who voluntarily
enroll in policy schools, and those who choose some other school but lose the lottery and
get randomly assigned to a policy school. The composition effect mainly captures changes
in the ability of the first type, “voluntary enrollees”. I analyze the baseline scores of sixth
graders who voluntarily chose a policy school and test if there is evidence of strategic
switching after the policy by high-performing students.
For the second type, “lottery losers”, they did not strategically change their school
choice after the policy, yet they still may benefit from attending a policy school compared
to previous cohorts, because now they have better peers. I exploit the random lottery
assignment to evaluate differences in value-added between the policy schools and the chosen
schools, before and after the policy, to see how the value-added gap was changed by the
policy-induced peer composition change. High-performing lottery losers may benefit more
from good peers and a tournament incentive than lower-performing lottery losers, therefore
I conducted instrumental quantile treatment effect analysis to detect differential treatment
effects along the distribution.
1.5.3 Change in Composition
The top ten-percent quota policy increases the expected return of attending the policy
schools, changes the trade-off of school choice, and therefore incentivizes some sixth graders
to strategically choose the policy schools. As illustrated in the conceptual framework,
switching to a policy school involves trade-offs. A student may benefit from the expectation
that he/she will be in the top ten-percent of the graduating class, but at the same time may
suffer from a lower peer quality. Therefore, it is unclear whether students would respond
to the policy by changing their school choice.
The composition effect has two dimensions, quantity and quality. Higher percentages
of sixth graders may voluntarily choose the policy; among those sixth graders who choose
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policy schools, the average baseline performance may be higher than before. First, to test
the quantity dimension of demand change, I use four years of lottery choice records from
2005 to 2008 and compute the percentages of students choosing the policy-impacted schools
for each elementary school. I run the following regression to check if there was a significant
increase in the percentages of students choosing the policy schools.
Perc(Sjt) = θj + βD(post)t + jt (1.6)
Perc(Sjt) is the percentage of 6th graders choosing policy school in elementary school
j in year t; θj stands for elementary school fixed effect; D(post)t is a dummy for post
policy years. β is the coefficient of interest, which indicates how many more students, in
percentage of their elementary schools, chose policy schools after the change. Table 1.6
shows that the percentages of students who chose policy schools did not significantly change
after the policy announcement. Therefore, there was not a significant increase in the
quantity of students voluntarily enrolled in policy schools.
To test the change in composition quality, I analyze the incoming students’ sixth grade
scores. Since I only have the sixth grade scores for one district in 2007-2010 and 2008-
2011 cohorts, I compare the change in scores of elementary students choosing the policy
school announced in 2008 for that district. To verify the generalizability of results from
this district, I compare the differences in school characteristics and policy impacts of this
district and other districts. Results show that the comparison between policy and non-
policy schools and policy impacts are not statistically different from those of other districts.
The conditional logistic regression with elementary school fixed effects is specified as below:
Pr(Si = 1|xi, D(post)t) = F (αi + xiβ1 + β2D(post)t +D(post)t ∗ xiβ3) (1.7)
where F is the cumulative logistic distribution, F (z) = exp(z)1+exp(z) . Si equals to 1 if student i
chose a 2008 policy school in year t; αi stands for elementary school fixed effect; D(post)it
is a dummy for year 2008 and xit is a vector of student i’s 6th grade math score and reading
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Table 1.6: Composition effect
Change in Percentages of Sixth Graders Choosing Policy Schools
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All Elementary schools Elementary schools with Non-Zero
Percentage Choosing Policy Schools
Dependent % of Students Choosing % of Students Choosing % of Students Choosing % of Students Choosing
Variable 2007 Policy Schools Any Policy School 2007 Policy Schools Any Policy School
After 2007 -0.0131 -0.0103
[0.0107] [0.0203]
After 2008 -0.00745 -0.00618
[0.0133] [0.0170]
Constant 0.0838*** 0.144*** 0.316*** 0.326***
[0.00752] [0.00659] [0.0131] [0.00783]
Elementary
School FE
Y Y Y Y
Observations 979 979 243 430
R-squared 0.617 0.722 0.931 0.907
Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Sample includes 2005-2008 four cohorts of elementary school graduates’ school choice. After 2007 equals to 1 if the
year is after 2007 and After 2008 equals to 1 if the year is after 2008.
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Table 1.7: Are elementary students with high ability and high SES more likely to choose
a policy school after the policy?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable choose a policy school
postXmath 0.049**
(0.0174)
postXreading 0.0217
(.0297)
postXfather politics 0.0055**
(0.00203)
postXmother politics 0.0095**
(0.0045)
postXfemale 0.017
(0.015)
Observations 4,151 4,151 2,746 2,499 4,570
Each column reports the marginal effect of the interaction term in a fixed effect logit
regression controlling for elementary school fixed effects, corresponding to Table 1.7. Ro-
bust standard errors were allowed to clustered at the elementary school level. Significance
level is indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Father and mother political sta-
tuses are dummy variables for any parental political affiliation, which are proxies for high
socioeconomic status. The table shows positive and statistically significant changes in
family background and baseline academic performance for students who voluntarily enroll
in policy schools.
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Table 1.8: Conditional logit estimates of choosing a policy school: Who Are Switching?
Dependent Variable Choosing a policy school
(1) (2)
6th grade score of math reading+math
post X top1% -0.381 -0.159
post X top5% 0.877 0.096
post X top10% 1.341** 1.580**
post X top20% 1.130** 0.702
post X top30% 0.794 0.635
post X top40% 1.344** 0.925
post X top50% 0.589 1.611***
Elementary School FE Y Y
Observations 4,570 4,570
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the elementary school level. Significance level:*** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table reports coefficients from fixed-effects logit regressions. The coefficients can not be interpreted as
magnitudes of changes in likelihood of choosing a policy school. Significance level and signs of the coefficients
provides information on who are switching. Sample used is merged lottery records with sixth grade scores
from one district in 2007 and 2008. In 2008, one middle school was impacted by the policy in this district.
The dependent variable equals to one if a sixth grader chose the 2008 policy school. “post” equals to 1 for
the year of 2008. “top x%” equals to 1 if a sixth grade’s score is in the top x% in their cohort, all “top x%”
categories are mutually exclusive and all regressions include dummies for each category.
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(Chinese) score. The coefficient of interest is β3, which tells us how the ability of incoming
students in the policy schools changed after the policy was announced.
Table 1.7 shows the regression results for Equation 1.7. Marginal effects on the inter-
action terms between post policy and student characteristics are reported. The interaction
terms of normalized sixth grade math score and dummies for parental political affiliations
are highly significant and positive. It indicates that students who have better math score
and better socioeconomic background are more likely to choosing policy schools after the
introduction of the ten-percent quota policy.
Although we now know that students with higher baseline math scores switch to choose
policy schools, we do not know if it is because of a heavy downgrade by a few top students,
or a small downgrade by many medium-ranking students. By analyzing the trade-off faced
by these students, the highest-performing students have less incentive to downgrade than
the second-tier-ranking students because the highest-performing students are confident
about getting elite high school admission, even without the policy guarantee. Therefore,
they have no benefit and no incentive to pay the cost of having lower quality peers by
switching to a policy school.
To test this hypothesis and understand the characteristics of the students who switch,
I use the same regression specification as Equation 1.7 and replace the actual baseline
score with the percentile category dummies that are mutually exclusive. For example, if
the top 5% takes value of 1, it means that a student has a baseline score between 1% to
5%. Estimates in Table 1.8 confirm the hypothesis that the highest-performing 6th graders
were not more likely to switch, while sixth graders with above-average math scores showed
statistically significantly switching patterns.
1.5.4 Change in Value-added
In the previous subsection, I show that the top ten-percent quota policy attracts students
with better math scores to voluntarily enroll in the treated lower-performing schools. One
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of the concerns is that the policy may have improved school average performance only by
redistributing students, without changing the school quality at all. After the policy, there
are three types of students in the policy schools: strategic switchers, students who would
have chosen the policy schools anyway and students who choose an over-subscribed school
but lose the lottery and get randomly assigned to a policy school. The previous subsection
analyzes school choices by the first two types of students; this subsection takes the last
type of students, lottery losers, and compare them with the lottery winners to estimate
value-added gaps between policy schools and over-subscribed schools.
Change in value-added can come from several channels. First, policy schools may bring
higher value-added to the cohorts entering middle school after the policy than previous
cohorts, because of better peers attracted by the policy. In addition, competition to place
at the top ten-percent of the graduating class encourage students to exert more effort.
Especially since policy schools determine ranking by three-year accumulated performance,
students need to work consistently throughout the three years. High-performing students
may benefit more from tournament incentive than lower-performing ones.
Different from school performance, school quality is usually difficult to measure because
of endogenous selection. Better students often sort into schools with better reputation,
which makes it hard to disentangle whether the higher performance in these schools comes
from incoming students’ ability or school quality. The random lottery assignment allows
me to use it as an instrument to evaluate differences in value added with the Local Average
Treatment Effect (LATE) model by Imbens and Angrist (1994). These LATE estimates
provide measurements of the school quality gap before and after the policy introduction
and therefore enable us to see changes in value-added.
The instrumental analysis uses the sample of students who chose an over-subscribed
school and randomly assigned to their choice schools or an under-subscribed policy school.
Let Yi(1) be student i’s potential test score if she attends a policy school, and let Yi(0)
be her test score if she attends her choice school. Di indicates the “treatment”, policy
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school attendance, and Zi is an indicator for lottery outcome. Let Di(1) and Di(0) denote
potential treatment status as a function of Zi. The following assumptions are needed for
LATE framework:
1. Independence and Exclusion Restriction: (Yi(1); Yi(0); Di(1); Di(0)) is independent of
Zi.
2. Nontrivial First Stage: Pr(Zi) = E[DilZi].
3. Monotonicity: Di(1) > Di(0) for all i.
The first assumption requires that lotteries are random and do not affect test scores through
any channel but policy school attendance. The second assumption requires that lottery
losers are more likely to attend policy schools on average. Monotonicity assumption requires
that winning the lottery does not encourage any student to attend a policy school instead
of the choice school. All three assumptions are satisfied in this study’s sample.
First, to verify the random lottery school assignment, I use a probit model to regress
students’ pre-lottery characteristics on their lottery outcomes. If the lotteries are random,
pre-lottery characteristics should not be able to predict the lottery outcome. I include
a group of dummy variables to control for the lottery choice and the elementary school
attended, since lotteries happen at the elementary school level. The regression equation is
Zic = αc + α1Xi + ic (1.8)
Zic equals 1 if the student i lost the lottery. Xi represents pre-lottery characteristics
including gender, city residency (hukou), parental political status, Chinese and math scores
in elementary school graduation exam. Parental political status and elementary school
graduation exam scores are only available for 2007, not for 2005 or 2006.
Table 1.9 reports the marginal effects of Xi and verifies the lottery randomness for 2005-
2008 and 2007-2010 cohorts. Pre-lottery characteristics cannot predict lottery outcomes for
these two cohorts. Conditional on taking the lottery, winning the lottery is an exogenous
event that sends students who made the same lottery choice into different middle schools in
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these two years. This gives us a device to peel away the endogenous school choice problem
and compare the value added of the policy impacted ones with the not impacted ones.
Results don’t change if I put more explanatory variables, for example sixth grade scores
and family background, in 2007-2010 cohort. I do not include 2006-2009 cohort in the
2SLS and instrumental quantile treatment effect analysis due to missing data.
This finding is of central importance for this paper, because one of the concerns for
the policy is that it may have improved school average performance only by redistributing
students and may have not improved the school quality of these low-performing schools at
all. The analysis here shows that before the policy, among the students who chose an over-
subscribed school, lottery losers who were randomly assigned to a low-performing policy
school performed worse than their elementary school classmates who won the lottery and
assigned to an over-subscribed school in the middle school graduation exams. After the
policy, their average outcomes were about the same. To verify the predictive power of losing
a lottery on attending a policy school, I run the first stage probit regression, controlling for
lottery choice group fixed effects and available student characteristics. Table 1.10 reports
the marginal effects and the Pseudo R squared, which indicates that using lottery outcomes
to instrument for policy school attendance is nontrivial.
Di = κc + α1Zi +Xiα2 + µic (1.9)
After verifying the assumptions needed for the LATE framework, students can be divided
into three types: always takers, who attend regardless of the lottery outcomes (Di(1)=
Di(0) = 1), never takers, who never attend policy schools (Di(1) = Di(0)= 0), and com-
pliers, who are induced to attend by receiving offers (Di(1) > Di(0)). The instrumental
variables methods can consistently estimate LATE, the average treatment effect for com-
pliers (Imbens and Angrist, 1994):
E[Yi|Zi = 1]− E[Yi|Zi = 0]
E[Di|Zi = 1]− E[Di|Zi = 0] = E[Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Di(1) > Di(0)] (1.10)
I use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) method to estimate LATE. The regression specifi-
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Table 1.9: Lottery Randomness Verification
Dependent Variable: Winning a Lottery
Year 2005 2007
female 0.0254 -0.00228 0.0115
(0.0180) (0.0151) (0.0175)
hukou -0.0208 0.0157
(0.0176) (0.0204)
father political status 0.0381
(0.0296)
mother political status 0.0606
(0.0466)
Lottery fixed effects Y Y Y
Observations 2,558 2,747 2,747
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the lottery
level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. Lottery fixed effects are interacted
dummy variables with elementary schools and middle school choice.
“Hukou” means whether the student has city residency or not.
“Father (mother) political status” indicates whether the student’s
parent has a party affiliation or not.
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cation is
Yi = θc + β1Di +Xiβ2 + ic (1.11)
where Yi is the normalized middle school graduation exam score for student i, Di is a
dummy variable indicating policy school attendance, and Xi is a set of elementary school
and lottery choice indicators and student characteristics. The first stage is specified in
Equation 1.9.
Table 1.11 reports the results of the 2SLS. The observations are less than the total num-
ber of students participating in school lottery assignment, because only lotteries involving
a policy school have variations in first stage outcome, i.e. policy school attendance. The
comparison between 2SLS estimates for two cohorts shows that the gap between value-
added by policy schools and oversubscribed schools were closed by the top ten-percent
quota policy.
As discussed at the beginning of this subsection, there are several channels that the
policy could have helped close the value-added gap. Peer effects could help improve value-
added to all students; a tournament effect could increase value-added to high-performing
students who have a chance to compete for the top-ten percent quota. Therefore, if we ob-
serve an value-added improvement to the low-performing students, that would be evidence
that peer effects were at work.
The LATE masks the heterogeneous treatment effects across students with different
academic performance. To see whether peer effects were at work, it is important to estimate
the treatment effect across the distribution. Here I use instrumental Quantile Treatment
Effect analysis (Abadie et al. (2002)) to analyze the gaps in distributions of value-added
between policy schools and chosen middle schools. Similar with 2SLS, this exercise is
carried out for two cohorts, one before the policy and one after the policy.
The instrumental QTE is “an Abadie-type weighting estimator of the causal effect
of treatment on quantiles for compliers” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The relationship
between the QTE estimator and quantile regression is analogous to that between 2SLS
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Table 1.10: First Stage: Use losing a lottery to instrument for policy school attendance
Dependent Variable: attending a policy school
Cohort 2005-2008 2007-2010
losing a lottery 0.244*** 0.393***
(0.0237) (0.0116)
female 0.0245 0.0001
(0.0246) (0.0160)
hukou 0.0202
(0.0192)
Lottery fixed effects Y Y
Observations 1,130 2,066
Pseudo R2 0.249 0.361
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the lottery level, ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Lottery fixed effects are interacted dummy
variables with elementary schools and middle school choice. hukou means
whether the student has city residency or not.
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Table 1.11: Average Change in School Quality Gap: 2SLS Results
Dependent Variable: Normalized 9th grade score
(1) (2)
Cohort 2005-2008 2007-2010
attending a policy school -0.302*** -0.0805
(0.0641) (0.0495)
Obs 1,130 2,066
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01. This table reports results of
2SLS regressions on two cohorts, before and after policy respectively. Each
coefficient shows the average school value-added gap between policy schools
and over-subscribed schools.
and OLS. The set up for QTE estimation is described as following. A scalar outcome
variable Y is students’ normalized ninth grade middle school graduation scores. D is a
binary treatment indicator for policy school attendance, and Z is a binary instrument for
losing a lottery. X stands for a set of dummies for elementary school and school choice,
and other student characteristics.
Qθ(Yi|Xi, Di, D1i > D0i) = αθDi +X ′iβθ (1.12)
where Qθ(Yi|Xi, Di, D1i > D0i) denotes the θ-quantile of 9th grade score conditional on
control variables Xi and policy school attendance Di for compliers.
The QTE estimation results for Equation 1.12 are reported in Table 1.12 and plotted
in Figure 1.5 for 2005-2008 and 2007-2010 cohorts. Looking at the 2005-2008 cohort, we
see a larger value-added gap for high-performing students. This is consistent with previous
findings in peer effects in Chinese secondary schools by Ding and Lehrer (2007). High-
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performing students benefit more from attending over-subscribed schools, which provide
better peer quality. For lottery losers who chose another middle school and were randomly
assigned to a policy school in 2005, before the ten-percent quota policy, the gap between the
distribution of 9th grade graduation scores and the lottery winners’ distribution was signif-
icantly negative for seven out of nine deciles. After the policy, however, most estimates are
insignificantly different from zero, which indicates that policy schools and over-subscribed
schools then have similar value-added. For 60th and 90th percentiles, the value-added by
policy schools for 2007-2010 cohort were still lower than over-subscribed schools, but less
so than the 2005-2008 cohort.
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Table 1.12: Change in Distributions of School Quality Gap: IV Quantile Treatment Effect
Dependent Variable: Normalized 9th grade score
Quantile 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
2005-2008 cohort -0.0845 -0.368*** -0.218 -0.501*** -0.505*** -0.528*** -0.525*** -0.435** -0.731***
(0.112) (0.114) (0.147) (0.154) (0.158) (0.165) (0.171) (0.186) (0.184)
2007-2010 cohort 0 0 -0.0496 0 0 -0.286*** 0 0 -0.324***
(0.0926) (0.107) (0.0698) (0.0811) (0.0778) (0.0811) (0.0698) (0.0550) (0.0999)
Each cell reports the coefficient of policy school dummy in a separate instrumental QTE regression, which uses losing lottery to
instrument for attending a policy school. The coefficient indicates the difference in distribution of normalized 9th grade score of
6th graders who were randomly assigned to a chosen school and a policy school.
Before the policy, seven out of nine coefficients for 2005-2008 cohort were significantly negative, which means that the value-added
to students by policy schools is lower for most of distribution. After the policy, all coefficients are indifferent from zero or less
negative than before. This shows that the top ten-percent quota policy narrowed value-added gap between the low-performing
schools and the over-subscribed schools.
43
Figure 1.5: Changes in Value-added Gaps
Notes: These two figures plot estimates of 2SLS and instrumental quantile regressions from 10
percentile to 90 percentile with a 10 percentile increment for two cohorts, one before the
ten-percent quota policy and one after the policy. 2SLS estimate and its 95% confidence interval
are in blue; those for IVQTE analysis are in red. These estimates indicate the value-added gap
between a policy school and an over-subscribed school.
The fact that the policy helped narrow the value-added gap for some low-performing
and middle-range students provides evidence of peer effects. High-performing students also
benefited from the policy in terms of value-added, which could be a mixture of tournament
and peer effects. In fact, if we move the 2005-2008 cohort value-added estimates upward
and compare that with 2007-2010 cohort’s estimates, the top thirty percentiles were moved
upward a little more than the other deciles, which may be some suggestive evidence for
tournament effect, or may come from a nonlinear peer effect. The instrumental QTE
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analysis does not provide strong evidence for the tournament effect, but supports that
peer effects are at work.
1.6 CONCLUSION
This paper evaluates a current education policy in Changsha that aims at improving low
performing middle schools. By guaranteeing seats in elite high schools to the top ten-
percent of students attending the policy schools, it seeks to improve the desirability of
these schools, attract better incoming students, bring positive peer effects and encourage
students to compete for the top ten-percent. I document that the policy helped narrow the
gap between low-performing policy schools and the other schools. Sixth graders with better
math scores and socioeconomic status are more likely to voluntarily enroll in the policy
schools, which improved the incoming students’ quality. Instrumental variable estimation
shows that the value-added gap between policy schools and over-subscribed schools was
closed, and instrumental quantile treatment effect estimates further confirms the effect is
prevalent across different deciles. It suggests that the top ten-percent quota policy was
successful in equalizing the performance and school quality between the low-performing
schools and over-subscribed schools.
There are two limitations of the study. First, this study cannot perfectly disentangle
different channels influencing changes in value-added, including peer effects, tournament
effects and possible teacher behavioral changes. Second, I do not observe the general
equilibrium effect, in other words, overall impact on the whole city. Instead of improving
low-performing school while keeping over-subscribed school quality the same, it might
be true that the previous performance gap and value-added gap were all driven by peer
composition; thus changes in sorting patterns closed both gaps. In future work, I plan to
collect college entrance exam performances for different counties in Hunan province across
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years to analyze the general equilibrium effects.
Results here on the top ten-percent quota policy complement findings in top ten-percent
rule in Texas by Cullen et al. (2013). Students do respond to the incentive of relative
grading. This study advances previous findings by estimating the the value-added gap
before and after the policy introduction, given the unique lottery school assignment system.
To what extent this result would apply to the environment with larger variation in racial
composition and instruction is unknown. The less racial difference inhibits peer effects, the
more this study could speak to cases such as Texas.
The study provides implications on how a government mandate on school admission
process influence sorting behavior, student outcomes and school outcomes. Early in 2014,
the Chinese Ministry of Education demanded local governments to abandon merit-based
admission and instead, enforce proximity-based admission that may be combined with
choice-based lottery school assignment. The aim is to curb sorting and equalize access to
school resources for students across the socioeconomic spectrum. This study, as well as
previous studies, has shown that students with low socioeconomic status are less likely to
choose a good school, which suggests that school-choice program is not a panacea and may
not suffice to close the income achievement gap. Policies that change sorting patterns and
attempt to improve low-performing schools’ quality are worth further exploration.
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2.0 PEER MENTORING AND GROUP INCENTIVES: EVIDENCE
FROM CHINESE RURAL MIDDLE SCHOOLS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Peer-assisted learning strategies have long been used and proven to be a cost-effective in-
tervention (Levin et al., 1984), yielding gains in both academic and transferable social and
communication skills to all participants (Cohen et al., 1982; Rohrbeck et al., 2003).1 Pre-
vious studies have used field experiments to evaluate the effects of the peer tutoring/group
study interventions (Angrist et al., 2009; Li et al., 2014; Blimpo, 2014). Researchers have
found evidence that incentives can sometimes be effective for encouraging and improving
learning, but that monetary incentive tied to test scores may not work because students
do not know how to improve learning by themselves (Kremer et al., 2009; Bettinger, 2012;
Fryer, 2011).
Low education quality and high drop-out rates are problems prevalent in the low-
income rural regions of developing countries. In rural Northwestern China, more than 14%
of middle school students drop out during their Nine Year Compulsory Education (Yi et
al., 2012). Given the mixture of educational and social/emotional issues faced by students,
many of whom live away from their families while attending school, peer mentoring may
address the diverse needs of mentees, while also benefiting mentors, who could derive
1Classwide peer tutoring is a well-known type of peer-assisted learning, in which students in a class
are paired to work together. Research indicates that it can significantly improve students’ performance in
reading, spelling, and math (Fuchs et al., 1997; Fantuzzo et al., 1992; Greenwood et al., 1989).
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pleasure and pride from helping their peers and learn from teaching.
We developed a peer mentoring program, which pairs high-achieving students as men-
tors to lower performing classmates of the same gender2. Incentives include snacks during
peer mentoring time (input) and prizes to award an increase in pair ranking change (out-
put). Previous research has documented benefits from introducing team-based incentive
for education, especially for disadvantaged groups (Li et al., 2014; Blimpo, 2014).
We pilot-tested the program with two rural middle schools in Yulin, Shaanxi Province
during the fall semester of 2013. We targeted the peer mentoring program at 7th grade
students at No. 5 Middle School and 8th grade students at Liangzhen Middle School; 8th
grade students at No.5 Middle School and 7th grade students at Liangzhen Middle School
comprised the control group. In total, there are six classes in each group, with 242 students
in the treatment group and 216 students in the control group. We conducted demographic
and mental health surveys and administered standardized math exams both before and
after the intervention.
The peer mentoring program had both intended and unintended effects. On the pos-
itive side, mentors experienced a 0.56 standard deviation improvement in math score. In
addition, none of the mentors in the treatment group dropped out of school during the
semester, and among the high performing students in the control group (who would have
been mentors had they been in the treatment group), only three out of 99 students dropped
out. The program also helped decrease the social stress and absence rates of mentors by
once per year, which is 28.6% lower than the control group.
However, contrary to the program’s intention, mentees exhibited no gains in math
scores and a 0.2 standard deviation decline in mental health scores after participating in
the program. Breaking the mental health scores into subcategories, we found that the
worsened mental health scores were mainly due to higher learning stress.
Even though objective evaluations showed that mentors benefited the most, mentees
2Rohrbeck et al. (2003) found that same-gender peer-assisted learning studies have a greater effect size
on average than mixed-gender ones.
48
reported a higher level of program helpfulness than mentors: 55 percent of mentees thought
that the peer mentoring program was very helpful whereas only 28 percent of mentors did
so. In addition, mentees were more likely to report that they would choose the same group
partner again (84%) than mentors (54%).
Our study is related to prior research examining the effect of peer mentoring/ tutoring
(Topping, 2005; Angrist et al., 2009), incentives to learn (Kremer et al., 2009), and educa-
tion interventions in developing countries (Kremer and Holla, 2009). In most of previous
peer mentoring/tutoring studies, the focus is the impact on mentees. When mentors were
studied, it was mainly to examine their fulfillment from responsibilities. Those studies that
did examine academic impacts on mentors primarily used self-reporting, which our study
shows can be unrelated to objective measures. Our study provides what we believe is the
strongest evidence to date of positive effects on mentors’ achievement.
We also found suggestive evidence that frequent and immediate reward for inputs (ie.
time) attracted more attention and provided greater motivation than future and uncertain
rewards for team performance. Unfortunately, we cannot discern whether this was because
frequent and immediate reward is more salient and effective or because incentives for input
work better than incentives for outcomes (Fryer, 2011).
Lastly, we tested, in the setting of a developing economy, an educational intervention
which is easy to implement and scale because of its simple design and low cost. Compared
to previous studies on education interventions in developing countries, such as computer-
assisted learning, teacher financial incentives, remedial and contract teachers, merit schol-
arships, or conditional cash transfers, the impact on mentors (0.56 standard deviation) in
our pilot study is among the highest (Kremer et al., 2009). The other nice feature of the
program is that the per capita cost is very low: less than $10 USD per treated student per
semester. The cost could be even lower if we decreased the frequency of snack prizes from
daily to weekly. Given the feedback from students, a weekly snack prize would probably
still suffice as motivation for peer mentoring input.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the design of the
peer mentoring program. Section 3 discusses pilot trial results and feedback. Section 4
discusses possible factors that drive our results and proposes program modifications that
could potentially prevent the unintended effects on mentees.
2.2 PROGRAM DESIGN
The peer mentoring program matched top students as mentors to lower-performing stu-
dents, and provided incentives for the two to study together, improve their academic per-
formance and complete their education. Mentors can work with mentees to study class
materials, discuss homework questions, review the questions they got wrong on previous
homework assignments and exams, highlight the key points for the exams, provide encour-
agement and support, and become a role model. Mentees would ideally better understand
the class materials and feel supported and encouraged. Witnessing their own improvement,
they would ideally have more confidence and interest in their studies, leading to more effort,
better outcomes and less likelihood of dropping out.
Mentors could also benefit from the program, consistent with the saying that “to teach
is to learn twice.” Giving and receiving elaborated help and providing answers is associated
with mathematics achievement (Webb and Farivar, 1994). Greenwood et al. (1989) shows
that mentors experience greater achievement than mentees. Mentors could also, ideally,
experience a sense of accomplishment from their mentees’ progress.
2.2.1 Pairing method
To create mentor/mentee pairs, students in each class were segregated by gender and
ranked according to their overall academic performance from the previous semester (based
on their performance on reading, math, English, politics, history, geology and biology),
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and divided into two equal size groups of those in the top and bottom 50th percentiles.
We then matched same-sex pairs of students within their percentile group. For example,
the top female student was matched with the female student who was just below the 50th
percentile within female students. If there were 40 students in a class (20 boys and 20
girls), the girl ranked first would mentor the 11th ranked girl, and the 10th ranked girl
would mentor the 20th ranked girl. The ranking gap between the mentors and mentees is,
by design, the same for every pair. We arranged the pairing in this way to maximize the
difference and consistency of the difference in academic performance between the mentor
and mentee.
2.2.2 Group Incentive Design
The peer mentoring program incentivized students to spend time together (input) and im-
prove the pair’s class rank (output). To encourage the pairs to study together, we provided
tasty, healthy snacks (like rice cake, dairy candies or fiber bars) for class teachers to reward
both mentors and mentees if they studied together. They could study between classes, at
morning and night self-study sessions, or during lunch and dinner breaks. Students were
asked to take notes so that the class teacher could verify the interaction between the pair
and reward accordingly with snacks. The pairs who did not take notes or randomly copied
something onto the notebook would not get a snack from the class teacher. Pairs who
studied together four or more times each week received a bonus snack at the end of the
week.
In addition, rewards were available to pairs based on the improvement in the average
ranking of mentor and the mentee in the school’s monthly exams that cover all subjects.
We used a comprehensive exam so that students would not be incentivized to put more
effort into only one subject (if performance on one were incentivized) at the expense of
others. We chose to use the schools’ own exams to encourage the students to closely follow
and grasp what they were taught in school. This design also makes the incentivized peer
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mentoring program more scalable because it does not require testing beyond what a school
already conducts.
For midterm and final exams, students were rewarded according to the following pro-
cedure. First, we rank the pairs by improvement from their previous ranking, which is
the average rank of both mentor and mentee. Then we divide them into three tiers - a
top third, middle third and bottom third, with the top third consisting of most improved
pairs. Each month, all students receive a surprise prize, but the top third of improvers
get a slightly superior prize to the middle third, and the middle third receive a slightly
better prize than the bottom third. Prizes, such as notebooks, pens or pencils, were diverse
enough to differ in desirability. As an example, if a mentor improves his ranking by 1 and
a mentee improves his ranking by 3, the pair’s average rank would increase by 2. If a first
tier pair’s ranking improves by 2 to 5 ranks, this pair would get the best type of prize.
The outcome-based incentive scheme was designed to incorporate several features.
First, the fact that everyone gets a prize, regardless of his or her performance, should
maintain student participation and help foster a positive attitude toward the program.
Second, since the reward is based on the improvement in ranking, all students, whatever
their rank, have the opportunity to earn rewards. Third, it is unlikely that the same pair
would improve or decline in average ranking each time, so different pairs are likely to get
top prizes each month. However, if either member of the pair drops out, no reward will be
given. This provides students with the incentive to provide social support to prevent their
partner from dropping out of school.
2.2.3 Implementation
We implemented the peer mentoring program in the fall semester of 2013 in the 7th grade
at No. 5 Middle School and 8th grade at Liangzhen Middle School, and used the 8th grade
at No.5 Middle School and 7th grade at Liangzhen Middle School as control groups. There
are six classes in each group, with a total of 242 students in the treatment group and 216
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students in the control group.
Our research group conducted baseline surveys and standardized math tests in late
September 2013. Research assistants located in the area explained the peer mentoring
program to teachers and students and announced the group matching according to the
previous semester’s overall ranking. After the initial visit, the researchers visited the
schools twice during the fall semester to give the teachers snack rewards and prizes for
improvement. We conducted an evaluation survey and math test in late February 2014.
The expenses for snacks, prizes for improvement, and compensation for extra work put
in by the teacher to check the notes and give snack prizes equaled approximately $2,100,
$150, and $100 USD, respectively, totaling to approximately $2,350 USD.
2.2.4 Balance Check: Pre-Treatment Characteristics
The baseline surveys include three main parts: 1. A student survey with questions on family
backgrounds, attitudes towards school, self-efficacy and emotion management, predictions
about who was most likely to drop out in class, etc. A mental health survey was included
in the baseline survey. We computed the mental health score based on answers to ninety
questions on learning stress, fear, impulsiveness, etc..
2. A standardized math test with twenty-five multiple-choice questions.
3. A teacher survey asking about their qualification, effort, values and predictions about
which students were most likely to drop out.
In this subsection, we look at baseline survey and math test scores to gain a general
picture of our sample and conduct a balance check to see how mentors and mentees differ
from their counterparts in the control group. Table 2.1 presents selected baseline character-
istics of mentors and mentees in treatment and control groups. Most of the pre-treatment
characteristics are balanced between two groups, including mental health score, parental
education, family size, poverty program participation, and classroom behavior. However,
7th and 8th grade mentees in the treated classes have baseline math scores that are 0.21
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and 0.67 standard deviation higher than those in the control group. The class size is on
average 4 students larger (40.5 versus 36.5) and class participation per day is about 1.5
times less for treatment group students, which may bias against a positive treatment effect.
Other than the aforementioned, we did extra balance checks and present the results in
Table A6. Mentees reported a 0.7 lower rating of “like going to school” on a scale from
1 to 10 relative to their counterparts in the control group, which may also create bias
against a positive treatment effect on academic and mental health improvement. Mentees
in the treatment group reported arguing with classmates less frequently and mentors in the
treatment group reported fighting with classmates less frequently, compared to the control
group. Note that there were 42 different comparisons (mentor and mentee * 21 items),
so we would expect about 2 significant differences on the basis of chance; however, there
were 10, albeit not going in any systematic direction in terms of favoring the treatment or
control group.
There was no statistical significance between treatment and control groups for class
teachers for the following characteristics: years of teaching experience, public qualification,
years of obtaining the qualification, years being the class teacher, or any other measured
attribute (see Appendix for details). Since we do not have perfectly balanced baseline
characteristics between treatment and control groups, especially for mentees, we include
baseline controls in all regressions with an outcome as dependent variable in our quantita-
tive evaluation.
2.3 EVALUATING THE PEER MENTORING PROGRAM
We analyze the treatment effects on mentors’ and mentees’ math scores, mental health
survey scores, staying in school or not, and other outcomes such as school attendance,
study habits and nonacademic behavior. We also summarize the subjective evaluations
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Table 2.1: Baseline Student Characteristics and Balance Check
Mentee Mentor
Control Treatment Diff Control Treatment Diff
Female 0.47 0.52 0.0502 0.475 0.5 0.0253
-0.501 -0.502 -0.0648 -0.502 -0.502 -0.0684
Class size 36.47 40.468 3.998*** 36.556 40.559 4.004***
-4.448 -2.676 -0.476 -4.529 -2.652 -0.516
Grade 7 Std Math -0.689 -0.476 0.213* 0.633 0.76 0.127
-0.452 -0.748 -0.124 -0.765 -1.119 -0.198
Grade 8 Std Math -0.864 -0.224 0.640*** 0.488 0.504 0.0156
-0.414 -0.804 -0.109 -0.773 -1.104 -0.178
Mental Health 61.63 59.25 -2.375 62.25 61.84 -0.409
-14.176 -14.129 -1.888 -14.667 -12.808 -1.946
Poverty Program 0.353 0.315 -0.0389 0.404 0.333 -0.0707
-0.48 -0.466 -0.105 -0.493 -0.473 -0.0998
Father Education 2.094 2 -0.094 2.202 2.246 0.0437
-1.008 -1.004 -0.154 -1.078 -1.054 -0.188
Mother Education 1.701 1.782 0.0814 1.808 1.822 0.14
-0.94 -0.984 -0.182 -0.986 -0.957 -0.141
Absence 1.077 1.149 0.0723 1.747 1.822 0.102
-0.683 -0.723 -0.13 -0.747 -0.833 -0.162
Obs 117 124 99 118
Note: First three columns takes the lower half performing students based on baseline math score
in the control classes as the control group for mentees. Similarly for mentors. “Control” and
“Treatment” column show the means and standard deviations in parentheses. “Diff” column shows
the difference and robust standard errors in parentheses, with significance level indicated by ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Baseline math scores are standardized within grade. Mental health
score is calculated based on 100 questions, with higher score meaning better mental health condition.
Parental education is categorical: less than elementary (1), elementary (2), middle school (3), high
school (4), vocational college (5), college graduates or above (6). Absence is self-reported frequency
per semester.
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and suggestions for the program, both of which provided by students and teachers in the
treated classes.
2.3.1 Main Results
We focus on three categories of outcomes, math score, mental health, and drop out rate,
in our main results. We hoped to see higher standardized math exam performance, better
mental health survey scores, and lower probability of dropping out (albeit possibly only in
the long run).
The baseline regression we use is:
Yisgc = β0 + β1Tsg + β2Xisgc + sgc + µisgc (2.1)
where Yisgc are a set of outcome variables, including post-intervention standardized math
score, mental health score, and a dummy for dropping out. When the outcome variable is
dichotomous, we use probit model for the estimation. Tsg is a dummy variable for program
treatment status, which equals to one if grade g of school s is treated. Xisgc represents a
set of pre-program characteristics, including standardized math score, gender, grade level,
parental education level, etc.. Since we only have twelve classes in this experiment, we used
wild cluster bootstrapping method from Cameron et al. (2008). This specification is used
to produce Table 2.2, Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, with different sub-samples and outcome
variables.
To evaluate treatment effects separately for mentors and mentees, we use the upper and
lower half ranking students in the control group as the counter-factual groups for mentors
and mentees. More specifically, we assign a placebo mentor or mentee identity for each
student in the control group: those who scored above median among the students of the
same gender in class are assigned as placebo mentors; those who scored below are placebo
mentees.
Table 2.2 shows treatment effects for post standardized math score, post mental health
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score, and drop-out probability for mentees (Panel A ) and mentors (Panel B) separately.
Treatment effect on alternative outcome measures, changes in pre and post math scores
and mental health scores, are analyzed and reported in column (2) and (4).
Panel A reports a negative impact on the change in standardized math scores for
mentees. It also shows that mentees in the treatment group report have a significantly
worse mental health score than the control group, with a size of 0.2 standard deviation.
Columns (7) and (8) show that the peer mentoring intervention reduces dropout probability
by around 0.81%, although the coefficients are not statistically significant.
Panel B, in contrast, shows that mentors experienced gains in both math score and
drop out rate, and no change in mental health scores. They had a 0.56 standard deviation
of improvement in math score with no significant change in mental health. In addition,
mentors reported 0.5 times fewer absences per semester, which is approximately 28.6%
fewer compared to the control group. No mentor dropped out of school during that semester
in the treatment group, while three students ranked in the top half of the control group
did.
2.3.2 Treatment Effects on Subcategories of Mental Health Survey, Study
Attitude, Effort and Behavior
Using the comprehensive survey, we estimate treatment effects on a larger set of outcome
variables using Equation 2.1 and present the results in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 for mentees
and mentors, respectively. Each coefficient reported comes from a separate regression that
includes grade and gender controls. Errors are clustered at the class level. Two speci-
fications are used: one uses post scores as the dependent variable and includes baseline
scores as control; the other uses change in score (post-baseline) as the dependent variable
and does not include baseline in control. Most results reported for these two specifications
are similar. Discrepancies happen when the baseline characteristics are not balanced be-
tween control and treatment groups. In those cases, we look at the results from the second
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Table 2.2: Treatment Effect on Math, Overall Mental Health and Dropout Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit
Dependent
Variable
Post std
math
Diff std
math
Post
mental
health
Diff men-
tal health
Post
absence
Diff
absence
Dropout
Dropout
any
Panel A: Mentee and Placebo Mentee Subsample
treat -0.145 -0.405** -3.147* -2.953 -0.111 -0.272 -0.132 -0.128
-0.146 -0.156 -1.702 -1.84 -0.146 -0.22 -0.282 -0.331
Obs 224 224 200 200 224 224 240 240
R-squared 0.079 0.054 0.498 0.031 0.041 0.029
Panel B: Mentor and Placebo Mentor Subsample
treat 0.570** 0.564** -0.128 0.164 -0.478*** -0.576** na na
-0.27 -0.278 -0.723 -1.594 -0.145 -0.239
Obs 209 209 190 190 209 209
R-squared 0.168 0.064 0.59 0.032 0.168 0.069
Significance level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Standardized Math Score has a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 for each grade in each
exam. Mental health score is calculated according to a 100 question survey, with higher score being
better mental health condition. Absence is student self-reported frequency of absence per semester.
Dropout in column (7) equals to 1 if we know a student dropped out of school. The dependent
variable dropout any in column (8) equals to 1 if a student dropped out or if he/she is missing from
our sample without knowing the reason.
All regressions have gender, grade and baseline controls. Columns (1)-(6) are OLS regression results
with robust standard errors clustered at class level in parentheses, corrected for small number of
clusters using wild cluster bootstrapping with 1000 replications. (7)-(8) are probit regression results
with robust standard errors clustered at class level in parentheses. Column 7 and 8 are empty in
Panel B because no mentor in treatment group dropped out.
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specification.
Panel A in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 separately present treatment effects on subcategories
of the mental health score on mentees and mentors. By decomposing the total mental health
score into subcategories, we see in Panel A in Table 2.3 that the worsened mental health
scores in mentees is mainly driven by higher learning stress. More daily study time and
the responsibility to improve performance and ranking in return for their mentors’ help
may have led to the higher learning stress of mentees.
Panel A in Table 2.4 shows that mentors experienced less social stress and were less anti-
social after the peer mentoring program. The interactions within pairs may have helped
mentors to relieve some social pressure and improve their social skills. However, mentors
showed higher level of guilt, which may have resulted from an inability to help resolve
mentees’ problems. The positive and negative effects of these three subcategories cancel
out, which gives us an insignificant change in overall mental health scores for mentors.
Panel B and C present the treatment effects on students’ study attitude, effort, and
behavior. Contrary to our intention to encourage more questions and less arguments,
mentees reported a lower likelihood of asking questions and an increased likelihood of
getting into arguments compared with the control group. The peer mentoring program
increased mentors’ affection for going to school (“On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you
like going to school?”), decreased the frequency of being bullied, and (recall from the main
results) lowered absence rate for class. The snack prize may have added more motivation
for going to school every day and made mentors like going to school better.
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Table 2.3: Treatment Effect on other variables of possible interests
Mentee and Placebo Mentee Subsample
Panel A: Treatment Effect on Itemized MHT score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Depend.
Variable
Control
Base-
line
Learning
stress
Social
stress
Anti-
social
Self-
guilty
Over-
sensitive
Physical-
signs
Fear
Impulsive-
ness
Post Y 0.885* 0.0481 0.387 0.619 0.0788 0.187 0.104 0.195
-0.479 -0.258 -0.383 -0.441 -0.32 -0.371 -0.37 -0.263
Diff N 0.873 -0.148 0.469 0.687 -0.0931 0.215 0.0835 0.137
-0.574 -0.268 -0.378 -0.431 -0.235 -0.518 -0.224 -0.367
Panel B: Treatment Effect on Study Attitude
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Depend.
Variable
Control
Base-
line
like
school
(1-10)
class
par-
ticipa-
tion
ask
ques-
tion
read
extra
exer-
cise
Post Y -0.203 0.175 -0.118 -0.106 0.0676
-0.601 -0.469 -0.105 -0.113 -0.109
Diff N 0.0246 0.642 -0.196* -0.0669 0.0952
-0.272 -0.941 -0.1 -0.0888 -0.0936
Panel C: Treatment Effect on Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Depend.
Variable
Control
Base-
line
bullied argument fight
late
hw
late
class
Post Y 0.114 0.521 -0.158 0.0452 0.0138
-0.0849 -0.435 -0.163 -0.32 -0.269
Diff N 0.0636 1.748* 0.0967 -0.28 0.132
-0.106 -0.894 -0.363 -0.379 -0.274
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the class level in parentheses, corrected for small number
of clusters using wild cluster bootstrapping with 1000 replications. This table only looks at the
subsample of mentees in the treatment group and the lower half performing students (based on
baseline math score) in the control group, with 225 observations.
All regressions include grade and gender as controls. Reported are coefficients for treatment dum-
mies. For each panel, first row uses post outcomes as dependent variables and include baseline
control and second row uses change as outcome (post-base) without baseline control. In Panel A, a
positive coefficient means a worse problem in that category. For example, learning stress is higher
in the treatment group than the control group. In Panel B and C, “class participation” asks for
daily frequency; “ask question”, “read”, “extra exercise” and “bullied” are categorical variables from
never (0), to sometimes (1), to often (2); other than “bullied”, all other variables in Panel C are
frequency per semester.
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Table 2.4: Treatment Effect on other variables of possible interests
Mentor and Placebo Mentor Subsample
Panel A: Treatment Effect on Itemized MHT score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Depend.
Vari-
able
Control
Base-
line
Learning
stress
Social
stress
Anti-
social
Self-
guilty
Over-
sensitive
Physical-
signs
Fear
Impulsive-
ness
Post Y 0.322 -0.550** -0.579** 0.851* -0.0729 -0.0969 0.129 -0.203
-0.283 -0.255 -0.229 -0.457 -0.186 -0.206 -0.623 -0.216
Diff N 0.508 -0.664** -0.718** 0.743* -0.23 -0.0669 0.174 -0.0531
-0.336 -0.304 -0.306 -0.444 -0.245 -0.194 -0.467 -0.324
Panel B: Treatment Effect on Study Attitude
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Depend.
Vari-
able
Control
Base-
line
like
school
(1-10)
class
partici-
pation
ask
question
read
extra
exer-
cise
Post Y 0.488* -1.022** 0.119 0.153 0.0741
-0.295 -0.509 -0.0953 -0.107 -0.0676
Diff N 0.292 -0.139 0.102 0.228 0.0168
-0.368 -1.537 -0.0991 -0.161 -0.0996
Panel C: Treatment Effect on Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Depend.
Vari-
able
Control
Base-
line
bullied argument fight late hw
late
class
Post Y -0.0812** -1.979 -0.597 -0.0235 -0.0786
-0.0372 -2.148 -0.782 -0.271 -0.288
Diff N -0.0278 -1.621 -0.355 -0.208 0.074
-0.0942 -2.655 -0.488 -0.369 -0.298
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the class level in parentheses, corrected for small number
of clusters using wild cluster bootstrapping with 1000 replications. This table only looks at the
subsample of mentors in the treatment group and the top half performing students (based on baseline
math score) in the control group, with 209 observations.
All regressions include grade and gender as controls. Reported are coefficients for treatment dum-
mies. For each panel, first row uses post outcomes as dependent variables and include baseline
control and second row uses change as outcome (post-base) without baseline control. In Panel A, a
positive coefficient means a worse problem in that category. For example, learning stress is higher
in the treatment group than the control group. In Panel B and C, “class participation” asks for
daily frequency; “ask question”, “read”, “extra exercise” and “bullied” are categorical variables from
never (0), to sometimes (1), to often (2); other than “bullied”, all other variables in Panel C are
frequency per semester.
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Figure 2.1: Kernel Density Plots of Mentees’ Standardized Math Scores
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Figure 2.2: Kernel Density Plots of Mentors’ Standardized Math Scores
63
Figure 2.3: Kernel Density Plots of Mental Health Scores
2.3.3 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2, and Figure 2.3 show the kernel density plots of math scores and
mental health scores pre and post-treatment. We separately plot the math scores of 7th
and 8th grade, because they took different exams and scores are normalized separately.
The observations on shifts in distributions are consistent with the results in Table 2. They
show that the negative coefficients on mentees’ math and mental health score come from
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positive changes in the control group while the treated mentees stayed the same.
In Figure 2.1, standardized math score distributions did not change much for mentees
in the treatment group, but shifted to the right for lower performing students in the control
group. Two plots on the left side of Figure 2.3 tell a similar story: there is a rightward
shift in mental health score distribution for mentees in the control group while the treated
mentees stayed the same. Meanwhile the distributions of mentors’ standardized math
scores shifted rightward significantly, as shown in Figure 2.2. Figure 2.3 provides little
evidence of a systematic shift in mental health score distributions for mentors.
We further quantify the treatment effect across students with different academic per-
formance and mental health with quantile regressions.
Yisgc = α
p
0 + α
p
1Tsg + α
p
2Xisgc + η
p
isgc (2.2)
where 0 < p < 1 indicates the proportion of the population having scores below the pth
percentile.
Figure 2.4 and Table 2.5 presents quantile treatment effects on math scores, for both
mentees and mentors. Figure 2.4 shows that the peer mentoring program improved stan-
dardized math score for almost all mentors with no significant improvement (there were,
in fact, negative point estimates at all quantiles except the lowest) for mentees. Mentors
generally gain more from the program when they have better academic performance, al-
though the top 10% students may not benefit as much. The gains in post standardized
math score increased for mentors from 10 to 75 percentile, but decreased from 0.783 stan-
dard deviation gain for mentors with standardized math scores at 75 percentile to 0.492
standard deviation for those at 90 percentile.
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Figure 2.4: Quantile Treatment Effects on Standardized Math Scores
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Figure 2.5: Quantile Treatment Effects on Mental Health Scores
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneous Effect on Math Score: Quantile Regressions
Panel A: Mentee and Placebo Mentee Subsample
Quantile 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Treat 0.0656 -0.193 -0.19 -0.157 -0.157
-0.19 -0.166 -0.155 -0.171 -0.263
Observations 224 224 224 224 224
Panel B: Mentor and Placebo Mentor Subsample
Quantile 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Treat 0.346 0.425** 0.616*** 0.783*** 0.492
-0.333 -0.167 -0.151 -0.143 -0.3
Observations 209 209 209 209 209
Notes: All regressions include grade, gender and baseline math scores
as control. Significance level indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Panel A takes the subsamples of mentees in the treatment
group and the lower half performing students (based on baseline
math score) in the control group. Similarly for Panel B. Standardized
Math Score has a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.
The quantile treatment effects on mental health are shown in Figure 4, where we see
no significant effect on mentors but negative effect on mentees, mainly for the top 40% in
the distribution. It suggests that worsened mental health scores for mentees mainly come
from those with better mental health conditions.
Similarly in Table 2.6, mental health scores remain unchanged for mentors but became
significantly worse for mentees at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the mental health
score distribution. The magnitude of worsened mental health score is around 0.28 standard
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deviations.
Table 2.6: Heterogeneous Effect on Mental Health Score: Quantile Regressions
Panel A: Mentee and Placebo Mentee Subsample
Quantile 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Treat -1.868 -4.200* -4.488*** -4.333* 1.5
-3.529 -2.299 -1.633 -2.333 -2.201
Observations 200 200 200 200 200
Panel B: Mentor and Placebo Mentor Subsample
Quantile 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Treat -0.517 -1.625 -0.978 2.529 -0.226
-2.652 -2.033 -1.535 -2.178 -2.498
Observations 190 190 190 190 190
Notes: All regressions include grade, gender and baseline mental health scores as control. Signifi-
cance level indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel A takes the subsamples of mentees
in the treatment group and the lower half performing students (based on baseline math score) in
the control group. Similarly for Panel B. Mental health score is better if higher.
2.3.4 Subgroup Treatment Effects
Understanding how the program impacts different subgroups is important for assessing
whether it is likely to be more successful in some environments or with some populations. In
Table A8, we add to the baseline regression equation (1) interaction terms of the treatment
dummy variable with subgroup characteristics.
Yisgc = β0 + β1Tsg + β2Xisgc + β2Tsg ∗Xisgc + sgc + µisgc (2.3)
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We look at two types of subgroups (gender and grade) and two outcome variables (math
score and mental health score). We do not find any significant gender difference in treat-
ment effect on math or mental health.
8th graders contributed the most improvement to math score for mentors. They expe-
rience a 0.654 standard deviation greater gain in standardized math score than 7th grade
mentors. Moreover, 8th grade mentees experience a smaller negative effect in mental health
scores than 7th grade mentees. It is possible that 8th graders were more familiar with each
other and could form stronger peer mentoring groups. However, since we treated two 7th
grade classes in one school and four 8th grade classes in the other, we do not know if the
heterogeneous treatment effects come from the difference in grade levels or the difference
in schools.
2.3.5 Qualitative Measures
To understand what might be driving the observed effects of the program, we separately
looked at students in the treatment group and tested if the following factors were corre-
lated with more positive treatment effect on math score: different levels of engagement and
satisfaction in the program (choosing the same partner again, feeling hopeful, feeling anx-
ious, deeming the program helpful, etc.), peer baseline academic performance, difference
between self and peer baseline academic performance, whether the class teacher teaches
math, teacher’s years of experience, etc. However, after controlling for baseline score and
a few characteristics, none of these factors were statistically significantly correlated with
post standardized math scores.
Other than the demographic, behavioral and mental health questions we asked in the
baseline survey, we also added peer program evaluation questions in the post survey. Over-
all, more than 90% of students found the program to be at least a little helpful (see
Table 2.7). Not reported in the table, 69.70% of students reported that they would choose
the same partner if they were to do the program again. Interestingly, given the largely
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positive results for mentors and negative results for mentees, more mentees than mentors
reported that the program is very helpful (55% versus 28%) and that they would choose
the current partner again (84% versus 54%).
We asked five questions about feelings towards the peer mentoring program, including
pride, anxiety, embarrassment, hope and frustration. Mostly the answers were positive.
Few students reported that they felt “very” anxious, embarrassed and frustrated. We
checked the students who gave very negative answers, such as feeling very anxious/very
embarrassed/no hope at all/very frustrated, and found that most of them were low per-
forming students (in terms of standardized math score).
In the evaluation survey, students also reported on mentoring timing, frequency, length
and main subject discussed. Most students (93.5%) reported having participated in peer
mentoring more than four times a week, the minimum requirement to get the weekly bonus
snack. Most peer mentoring activities happened in between classes or during morning and
night self-study sessions, and usually for 20-30 minutes per day (73%). We tested whether
the frequency and length can help explain the benefit in the academic or mental health
score changes of mentor/mentee and did not find any statistically significant evidence.
2.4 CONCLUSIONS
The most striking finding in the study is that, contrary to expectations and intentions,
mentors gained more from the program than did mentees, who, in fact, mainly suffered
negative effects. Mentors benefited on multiple dimensions (better math scores, less social
stress, lower dropout rate, more affection for school, less absence, and extra reading after
class) with slightly more guilt, which may stem from their inability to always resolve
questions from mentees. Mentees did not gain in standardized math score and reported
higher learning stress.
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Table 2.7: Student Subjective Survey Evaluation
Part A: Is the peer mentoring helpful?
mentor mentee
# student % student # student % student
Helpful
Not at all 17 14.91 4 3.48
A little 65 57.02 48 41.74
Very much 32 28.07 63 54.78
Part B: Does peer mentoring makes you feel ?
mentor mentee
# student % student # student % student
proud
Not at all 59 51.75 45 39.13
A little 45 39.47 60 52.17
Very much 10 8.77 10 8.7
anxious
Not at all 63 55.26 60 52.17
A little 48 42.11 50 43.48
Very much 3 2.63 5 4.35
embarassed
Not at all 95 83.33 78 67.83
A little 17 14.91 36 31.3
Very much 2 1.75 1 0.87
hopeful
Not at all 20 17.54 12 10.43
A little 63 55.26 68 59.13
Very much 31 27.19 35 30.43
frustrated
Not at all 89 78.07 86 74.78
A little 22 19.3 26 22.61
Very much 3 2.63 3 2.61
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If distributional concerns were not an issue, the program could be deemed a success,
since mentor gains were greater than (insignificant) mentee reductions in academic scores.
Yet it is unfortunate that the program did not benefit those who needed it the most - the
students performing in the lower half.
Although we intended to solicit group incentives for both study effort and academic
improvement, the program as implemented turned out to place far more emphasis on snack
prize for peer mentoring time (but not quality) than on prizes for group improvement.
Mentors and mentees may have spent enough time together, but they studied separately.
A student wrote in the post-survey that all they cared about was the snack (, and no
one cared about actually helping each other). Other than the possible theory proposed
by Fryer (2011), that students do not know the education production function to respond
to outcome incentive effectively, it is also possible that students were present-minded and
hence more motivated by the immediate and frequent availability of snacks. Finally, it is
possible that the quality differences in rewards for improving pair testing rank were not
sufficient enough to motivate mentees to improve their scores. The insufficient prize for
mentees’ improvement may be the main reason why our results are different from previous
studies, which found that using monetary prizes as group incentives by itself helps improve
test scores (Blimpo, 2010), especially for mentees (Li et al, 2014).
The program may have also increased stigma for those at the bottom, since the pairing
mechanism was transparent to students. A cross-age peer mentoring program, which pairs
students at higher grades with students in lower grades, might avoid the stigma effect for
mentees while still providing students in the higher grades, with the benefits of mentoring.
Yet, it is unknown and worthy of study whether lower performing students in the higher
grade will also benefit from mentoring, and whether students will benefit from helping
others with material that they have learned in previous years.
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3.0 EFFICIENT PROCRASTINATION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Procrastination often negatively affects people’s study and work, inflicts costs on businesses
and governments, and hurts people’s physical and financial health (Ferrari et al., 1995;
Tice and Baumeister, 1997).There are three main causes for procrastination. First, people
have planning fallacy and are naive with their hyperbolic discounting; second, people lack
confidence, and therefore self-handicappers create conditions that make success impossible;
third, people have divided inner selves and sometimes bargaining failure occurs (Akerlof,
1991; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001; Frederick et al., 2002; Steel, 2007). The most prevalent
solution is to use external tools such as deadlines to help the parts of ourselves that want
to work. Studies have shown that these self-committing devices are useful, for example
(Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002).
People sometimes find procrastinating exciting because the last-minute panic usually
sends them off to an intense period of time. They focus all their attention on the goal,
ideas flow out of their mind, and their hearts beat fast. At the end, they are satisfied with
the work, not just because it satisfies a decent standard (may not be the best they can do),
but more importantly, they spend a minimal amount of time on it to achieve that level
of quality. If so, these people would postpone their tasks because their prediction of low
efficiency of doing things well in advance and high efficiency of doing things right before
deadlines and they prefer to suffer for a shorter period of time. However, the problem of
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procrastination comes when they procrastinate too much and the time left is not enough
to achieve a minimum quality–then they panic and cannot even efficiently use the limited
time left.
The under-motivation at the beginning and the over-motivation near the end yields
a hump-shape curve relationship between efficiency and timing. Building upon previous
research on optimal arousal theory (Yerkes and Dodson, 1908) and attentional focus theory
(Karau and Kelly, 1992), this study develops a conceptual framework of efficient procras-
tination. The theory predicts that people enjoy a high efficiency, thus perform better
and spend less time on the task when they work not too early nor too late – “efficiently
procrastinate”.
The study provides empirical evidence to support the hypothesis, using online home-
work tracking data from an undergraduate economics class. I examine the relationship
between how early a student starts/submits/works on the homework affects the homework
performance and time cost. The within-subject analysis rules out self-selection problems,
which plague many previous studies on procrastination. Results show a non-linear rela-
tionship as predicted: the normalized homework score is higher and the time cost is lower
when he/she submits the homework neither too early nor too late.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the conceptual frame-
work of efficient procrastination. Section 3 describes the source and construction of the
data. Section 4 presents the empirical strategies and the results. Section 5 concludes and
discusses possible confounds and solutions.
3.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Previous research shows that people prefer to incur a loss immediately rather than delay
it. This may seem to go against procrastination because if people prefer to pay the cost
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as soon as possible they shouldn’t postpone it. However, many people have the experience
that they usually concentrate best and do things most efficiently right before the deadline.
With a far-away deadline and little pressure, people tend to slow things down and fail
to complete the task within the time needed if they focus. On the other hand, people
prefer to spend a shorter time period to do work conditional on the same output, which
not only saves time for other things but also gives a feeling of fulfillment. Therefore, it
is a strategic choice to reasonably procrastinate. For some people, they are overconfident
about their ability of completing the task and begin the task too late. Close deadline and
heavy pressure may lead to failure of focus, or a “choking” effect (Baumeister, 1984). In
that case, instead of procrastination, people may lower the quality of completion and may
even give up the task.
This framework is consistent with two existing models, the Yerkes-Dodson Law (Yerkes
and Dodson, 1908) and the attentional focus model by Karau and Kelly (1992). The
Yerkes-Dodson Law examines variance in habit formation based on the strength of stimuli:
when stimuli were either too intense or lacked intensity, a drop in performance occurred.
The attentional focus model suggests that time scarcity focuses group members’ attention
on most relevant cues for task completion therefore improves group performance.
I propose the following framework to incorporate people’s preferences on both work
quality and time cost, as well as the non-linear progression of work efficiency, which first
goes up then goes down as time approaches the deadline.
max
T
U(y(T ), c(T )) (3.1)
where U is the utility function increasing in the outcome, y, and decreasing in the time
cost, c. y and c are both a function of T, which is the time available before the deadline.
y′ > 0, y′′ < 0, c′ < 0, and c′′ > 0. Graphical presentations of these two equations are a
hump-shape curve of performance and how early a person starts to work (can be viewed as
not procrastinating) and a U-shape curve of time cost and working early. However, taking
into account that a person also has less time to be taken away when it is very close to the
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deadline, we may observe a downward sloping curve of time cost and working early.
At the beginning of the task, people are usually under-motivated because the available
time is abundant. Therefore, people are not very concentrated and easily distracted when
working, which leads to longer time cost and lower work quality. As time goes by, when one
has just enough time to finish the work by the deadline, productivity is at its highest level.
One is most concentrated, which results in high efficiency, low time cost, and high work
quality. When one starts to work when it is too close to the deadline, however, productivity
goes down. In this situation, one is under pressure and overly motivated. Choking effect
would prevent him from focusing on the task and make him do worse than usual. One may
panic and cannot stop thinking about the aftermath of failure in task completion.
The conceptual framework predicts that given a time-constraint task, if a person works
on it at a timing that is not too early nor too late, he/she would focus the most and
therefore enjoy a high performance with a low time cost.
3.3 DATA
3.3.1 CourseWeb Tracking Data
The panel data set used to test the predictions is constructed from online homework track-
ing reports and grades from an introductory economics class in the University of Pittsburgh.
255 students registered in this class and were requested to finish ten homework assignments
on CourseWeb. This panel feature enables me to conduct both between and within subject
analysis.
Each homework assignment consists of 20 multiple choice problems covering the ma-
terial they learned during recent week. Each problem is 1 credit, therefore the full score
is 20. Usually they have around one to two weeks to do the homework. CourseWeb will
shut down the access to homework after it passes the deadline. A function on CourseWeb
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called Statistics Tracking allows instructors to observe student homework activities. More
specifically, the statistics tracking reports contain information on how many times a stu-
dent opened each homework on any specific date (from here on, I call it an entry). I match
these reports with students homework scores and exam scores to obtain a panel data set
of every student’s online homework activity and performance for each assignment.
3.3.2 Measurements of Procrastination, Time Cost and Performance
Homework scores, normalized scores, and ranking in class are used as the performance
measures. The higher the rank value is, at the higher percentile a student is in the class.
Timing, or the degree of procrastination, is measured by how many days earlier than the
deadline a student starts/submits/shows the maximum entries into the homework. Starting
date is identified when the first entry happened, the submission date is identified when the
last entry happened, and the doearly date is identified when the maximum entry happened.
I refer to them as “startearly”, “submitearly”, and “doearly.”
There are two candidate measures for time cost. One is the number of lagged days
between when a student started the homework and he/she submitted the homework, here-
after “lag.” This measure is very crude, because many students may decide to click into
the homework and check it out, but did not intend to start it, which is supported by the
summary statistics that students on average first enter into an assignment 9.944 days in
advance of the deadline, but make the maximum entries and submit the homework 4.961
days and 2.839 days in advance. Therefore, I do not use lag as the time cost measure, but
instead, use it as a control variable in some analysis, since students may behave/perform
differently when given more days to work on a homework assignment.
The second candidate measure for time cost is how many times one entered into the
homework page, hereafter “entrytimes.” It is not an accurate measure of how much time
the student spent on the homework, but it is the best proxy to my ear. There could be
students who only open the webpage and do nothing, but it is unlikely that one clicks the
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES mean sd min max N
homework score 16.32 3.143 0 20 2,359
total entries 5.212 3.468 0 29 2,476
total days available 13.37 3.083 8 19 2,475
start early (days) 9.944 4.477 1 19 2,475
finish early (days) 2.839 2.183 1 19 2,475
do early (days) 4.961 4.117 1 19 2,475
normalized hw score 0 1 -8.540 2.049 2,359
normalized start early 0.723 0.240 0.0526 1 2,475
normalized finish early 0.225 0.178 0.0526 1 2,475
normalized do early 0.368 0.269 0.0526 1 2,475
Note: The data set is constructed from online homework tracking logs for nine
homework assignments in an introductory microeconomics course with 255 students,
from different years in college and different majors. Each homework has 20 multiple
choice questions, and the maximum score is 20. Total entry counts how many times
a student click into the homework. Total days available means the number of days
an online homework is open to students. Start/Finish/Do early is the number of
days before the deadline when a student start/submit/has the maximum entries of
the homework. Normalized start/finish/do early is constructed as the total days
available divided by start/finish/do early.
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webpage by chance all the time. The student must have the intention to do the homework
or at least look at it. One reason why there are multiple entry times per day is that the
webpage expires when it is inactive for a while. If a student opens the homework webpage
and then turns to chat on Facebook for an hour, the webpage expires and he/she has to
relog in the CourseWeb. In this sense, it is a fairly good measure of time cost on homework.
As for measures of starting and finishing doing the homework, I divide the number of
days starting/finishing homework in advance of deadline by the number of days available.
For any student on each homework assignment, the normalized early measure is a number
from 0 to 1. The larger norm startearly/norm doearly/ norm submitearly is, the earlier
the student starts to look at/ works the most on/ submits the homework.
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics. Students usually submit the home- work one
to two days earlier than the deadline. Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show us the general patterns
on how early students start/submit/do their homework. A large portion of students check
out homework early (startearly close to 1) and submit it late (submitearly close to 0).
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Figure 3.1: Homework Start/Submit Timing Patterns
Note: In these density graphs, x-axis is the normalized measures of timing, with 0 being the
deadline and 1 being the time when an assignment is posted.
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Figure 3.2: Homework Start/Submit Timing Patterns
Note: In these density graphs, x-axis is the normalized measures of timing, with 0 being the
deadline and 1 being the time when an assignment is posted.
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3.4 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
Using online homework tracking data, I construct various performance measures, working
early measures, and time cost measures. In this section, I conduct two sets of analysis to
explore the relationship between time and work efficiency, measured by performance and
time cost. Throughout the empirical analysis below, outcome variables are performance
(score and rank) and time cost (total entries into the homework) and explanatory variables
are work timing (absolute or normalized startearly/ doearly/ submitearly).
3.4.1 Between-subject Analysis
In the between-subject analysis, I regress homework performance on procrastination mea-
sures and its quadratic form. This exercise shows us whether those students who start or
finish early do better than those who start or finish late, and whether the relationship is
non-linear.
Yij = α0 + α1Eij + α2E
2
ij + µij (3.2)
where Yij are performance measures and time cost measures; Eij are procrastination mea-
sures (how early a student i starts/does/submits his/her homework j.
Table 3.2 shows the results of Equation 3.2 when independent variables are homework
score, normalized homework score (with mean 0 and standard deviation 1), homework score
rank in class (larger value means higher ranking) and dependent variables are measures
of how early a student starts and submits an assignment. Nomalized start/finish early is
constructed as the total days available to do the homework divided by the number of days
before the deadline when a student start or finish the homework. For example, if a student
starts 2 days before the deadline, submits it 1 day before the deadline and the total days
available is 8 days, then norm startearly equals to 2/8=0.25 and norm finishearly equals
to 1/8=0.125. Panels A/ B look at the relationship between performance and start early/
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finish early. Results for do early are similar with those for finish early. For each panel, first
three columns show the result of quadratic effect of timing on performance. The following
three columns add control of total entries into the homework.
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 show that students who start early generally do better than
the others, but also spend more time on the homework than the others. As for people
who finish early, they not only do better than the others, but also spend less time on it.
Both timing-performance relationship and timing-time cost relationship are in a nonlinear
fashion, as shown in a binned scatter plot in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.3: Between-Subject Analysis:
Relationship between Start/Do/Submit Early and Homework Performance
Note: These are binned scatter plots with quadratic fitted lines, controlling for midterm and final scores.
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Figure 3.4: Between-Subject Analysis:
Relationship between Start/Do/Submit Early and Time Cost
Note: These are binned scatter plots with quadratic fitted lines, controlling for midterm and final scores.
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Table 3.2: Between-subject analysis: Performance and Timing
Panel A. performance and start early
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Depend. Var. homework
score
normalized
hw score
score
ranking
homework
score
normalized
hw score
score
ranking
norm startearly 3.107** 1.110*** 85.32*** 2.990** 1.066*** 81.95***
(1.211) (0.393) (23.84) (1.209) (0.391) (23.78)
norm startearly sq -1.086 -0.666** -53.85*** -1.431 -0.795** -63.83***
(0.975) (0.315) (19.57) (0.973) (0.313) (19.35)
hw entry times 0.0838*** 0.0314*** 2.421***
(0.0249) (0.00792) (0.613)
Observations 2,358 2,358 2,358 2,358 2,358 2,358
R-squared 0.019 0.007 0.008 0.026 0.016 0.022
Panel B. performance and submit early
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Depend. Var. homework
score
normalized
hw score
score
ranking
homework
score
normalized
hw score
score
ranking
norm finishearly 6.125*** 2.327*** 163.2*** 7.101*** 2.583*** 181.2***
(1.501) (0.478) (30.23) (1.503) (0.482) (30.19)
norm finishearly sq -5.318*** -2.622*** -198.7*** -5.616*** -2.700*** -204.2***
(1.837) (0.556) (35.50) (1.822) (0.551) (35.02)
hw entry times 0.150*** 0.0392*** 2.773***
(0.0233) (0.00744) (0.563)
Observations 2,358 2,358 2,358 2,358 2,358 2,358
R-squared 0.015 0.013 0.014 0.041 0.030 0.037
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Independent variables are
homework score, normalized homework score (with mean 0 and standard deviation 1), homework
score rank in class (bigger number means higher ranking). Dependent variables are measures of how
early a student starts and submits an assignment. Nomalized start/finish early is constructed as the
total days available to do the homework divided by the number of days before the deadline when a
student start or finish the homework.
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3.4.2 Within-subject Analysis
Although the between-subject analysis strongly supports the non-linear predictions by
efficient procrastination framework, it could be explained by selection. Students who start
to work early may be those who are struggling in class. Therefore, even though they
work early, they still get a low score in homework assignments and spend more time than
other students. This alternative explanation may confound the inferences on the efficient
procrastination.
To rule out the alternative explanation from the self-selection, I take advantage of
the panel feature of the data and add individual fixed effects to conduct within-subject
analysis. I use homework score, normalized homework score, and ranking in class as the
performance measures and normalized starting early, normalized submitting early, and
normalized do early as the main explanatory variables. The larger the number for rank is,
higher the student ranks in the class and better he/she performs. Normalized measures of
starting early and finishing early are generated by dividing startearly and finishearly by
the available time for each homework.
Yij = βi + β1Eij + β2E
2
ij + ij (3.3)
where Yij are performance measures and time cost measures; βi is a vector of individual
fixed effects, Eij are procrastination measures (how early a student i starts/does/submits
his/her homework j.
Table 3.4 presents results of fixed-effects OLS regressions using data on 255 students’
10 homework activities in an introductory economics class. 142 observations are dropped
because scores are zero or missing. Independent variables are homework score, normalized
homework score (with mean 0 and standard deviation 1), homework score rank in class
(bigger number means higher ranking). Dependent variables are measures of how early
a student starts and submits an assignment. Nomalized start/finish early is constructed
as the total days available to do the homework divided by the number of days before the
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Table 3.3: Between-subject analysis: Time cost (total entries) and timing
Panel A: Absolute Early Measures as Explanatory Variables
Dependent Variable: Total Entries into Homework
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Early Measure startearly startearly finishearly finishearly doearly doearly
early 1.074 0.547 -6.700*** -1.221 -0.285 3.933***
(1.141) (1.134) (1.379) (1.397) (1.153) (1.149)
early squared 4.192*** 3.801*** 1.665 -3.009** 2.215* -2.461*
(1.109) (1.109) (1.427) (1.460) (1.293) (1.281)
total days available 0.212*** 0.309*** 0.373***
(0.0188) (0.0191) (0.0187)
Observations 2,475 2,475 2,475 2,475 2,475 2,475
R-squared 0.195 0.225 0.076 0.140 0.021 0.124
Number of stu 255 255 255 255 255 255
Panel B: Normalized Early Measures as Explanatory Variables
Dependent Variable: Total Entries into Homework
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Early Measure normalized
startearly
normalized
startearly
normalized
finishearly
normalized
finishearly
normalized
doearly
normalized
doearly
early 0.494*** 0.497*** -0.297*** -0.105 0.187*** 0.284***
(0.0433) (0.0435) (0.0812) (0.0781) (0.0602) (0.0580)
early squared -0.00656*** -0.00407 0.000567 -0.0166*** 0.000546 -0.0114***
(0.00236) (0.00268) (0.00549) (0.00533) (0.00417) (0.00414)
total days available -0.0961*** 0.382*** 0.332***
(0.0358) (0.0186) (0.0186)
Observations 2,475 2,475 2,475 2,475 2,475 2,475
R-squared 0.224 0.227 0.033 0.146 0.054 0.127
Number of stu 255 255 255 255 255 255
Note: Absolute early measures are the number of days before deadlines; normalized early measures
are absolute ones divided by total days available.
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deadline when a student start or finish the homework. For example, if a student starts 2
days before the deadline, submits it 1 day before the deadline and the total days available is
8 days, then norm startearly equals to 2/8=0.25 and norm finishearly equals to 1/8=0.125.
Panels A and B separately look at effect of start early and finish early. For each panel,
first three columns show the result of quadratic effect of timing on performance.
I plot binned scatter plot and predict a fitted quadratic line for relationship between
performance and timing, controlling for student individual fixed effects. In Figure 3.5, the
shape of fitted quadratic line in normalized finish early is the closest to the theoretical
predictions: hump shape curves of performance and working early. Those for normalized
do early and normalized start early is not clear enough. This indicates that, for each
individual student, when he/she submits the homework not too early nor too late, he/she
gets a higher homework score.
Similarly, Table 3.5 and Figure 3.6 show the relationship between time cost and timing,
controlling for student fixed effects. The relationship between start/finish early and time
cost is close to linear: when students start early, they enter into the homework website
more times, which indicates that they spend more time on the homework; when students
finish early, they submit homework early and enters into the homework website less times.
The relationship between do early and time cost matches the best with the prediction
from the conceptual model in section 3.2: a U-shaped curve. This indicates that, for each
individual student, when he/she focuses to do the homework not too early nor too late,
he/she spends the least time on this assignment.
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Table 3.4: Within-Subject Analysis: Normalized Timing and Homework Performance
Panel A. effect of start early
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Depend. Var. homework
score
normalized
hw score
score
ranking
homework
score
normalized
hw score
score
ranking
norm startearly 1.853 0.693* 62.75*** 1.725 0.645* 59.50***
(1.146) (0.354) (22.03) (1.146) (0.354) (22.00)
norm startearly sq -0.361 -0.469* -44.99*** -0.512 -0.526* -48.82***
(0.907) (0.280) (17.43) (0.908) (0.280) (17.43)
hw entry times 0.0570** 0.0214*** 1.448***
(0.0229) (0.00707) (0.439)
Student Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,358 2,358 2,358 2,358 2,358 2,358
R-squared 0.015 0.002 0.004 0.017 0.007 0.009
Number of stu 255 255 255 255 255 255
Panel B. effect of finish early
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Depend. Var. homework
score
normalized
hw score
score
ranking
homework
score
normalized
hw score
score
ranking
norm finishearly 1.083 0.603 65.03** 2.209* 0.814** 77.86***
(1.333) (0.410) (25.46) (1.337) (0.413) (25.68)
norm finishearly sq 0.218 -0.811 -101.2*** -0.357 -0.919* -107.7***
(1.676) (0.515) (32.02) (1.666) (0.515) (31.99)
hw entry times 0.122*** 0.0229*** 1.389***
(0.0213) (0.00658) (0.409)
Student Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,358 2,358 2,358 2,358 2,358 2,358
R-squared 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.019 0.007 0.011
Number of stu 255 255 255 255 255 255
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table presents results of
fixed-effect OLS regressions using data on 255 students’ 10 homework activities in an introductory
economics class. 142 observations are dropped because scores are zero or missing. Independent
variables are homework score, normalized homework score (with mean 0 and standard deviation 1),
homework score rank in class (bigger number means higher ranking). Nomalized start/finish early
is constructed as the total days available to do the homework divided by the number of days before
the deadline when a student start or finish the homework. Panel A and B separately look at effect
of start early and finish early. For each panel, first three columns show the result of quadratic effect
of timing on performance. The following three columns add control variable “total entries into an
assignment”.
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Table 3.5: Within-Subject Analysis: Timing and Time Cost (total entries)
Panel A: Absolute Early Measures as Explanatory Variables
Dependent Variable: Total Entries into Homework
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Early Measure startearly startearly finishearly finishearly doearly doearly
early 0.403*** 0.396*** -0.303*** -0.0660 0.179*** 0.282***
(0.0466) (0.0467) (0.0752) (0.0683) (0.0496) (0.0461)
early squared -0.00400* -0.00513** 0.00640 -0.0139*** 0.000265 -0.0130***
(0.00227) (0.00235) (0.00562) (0.00512) (0.00311) (0.00295)
total days available 0.0499* 0.387*** 0.356***
(0.0282) (0.0167) (0.0182)
Student FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,475 2,475 2,475 2,475 2,475 2,475
R-squared 0.266 0.267 0.026 0.216 0.069 0.206
Number of stu 255 255 255 255 255 255
Panel B: Normalized Early Measures as Explanatory Variables
Dependent Variable: Total Entries into Homework
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Early Measure normalized
startearly
normalized
startearly
normalized
finishearly
normalized
finishearly
normalized
doearly
normalized
doearly
early 2.070* 1.227 -9.232*** -1.841 -1.850* 2.791***
(1.073) (1.023) (1.171) (1.171) (0.954) (0.889)
early squared 2.589*** 2.006** 5.064*** -1.128 3.574*** -1.570*
(0.847) (0.807) (1.376) (1.332) (0.984) (0.920)
total days available 0.266*** 0.328*** 0.379***
(0.0175) (0.0184) (0.0172)
Student FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,475 2,475 2,475 2,475 2,475 2,475
R-squared 0.185 0.262 0.095 0.209 0.025 0.201
Number of stu 255 255 255 255 255 255
Note: Absolute early measures are the number of days before deadlines; normalized early measures
are absolute ones divided by total days available.
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Figure 3.5: Within-Subject Analysis:
Relationship between Start/Do/Submit Early and Homework Performance
Note: These are binned scatter plots with quadratic fitted lines, controlling for individual fixed
effects.
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Figure 3.6: Within-Subject Analysis:
Relationship between Start/Do/Submit Early and Time Cost
Note: These are binned scatter plots with quadratic fitted lines, controlling for individual fixed
effects.
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3.5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper provides a new perspective showing that procrastination is not necessarily
counter-productive. Given a task with a deadline, appropriate postponing can raise the
level of focus, therefore not only improve the performance but also shorten the time spent
on the task. Analysis of a data set of college students’ procrastination on homework
supports the hypothesis. It shows that working early affects students’ efficiency, measured
by homework performance and time cost, in a nonlinear way.
Starting to work too early or too late brings under or over motivation and therefore
lowers one’s efficiency, which leads to low performance and high time cost. It supports the
efficient procrastination framework that people may benefit from appropriate amount of
procrastination because of efficiency gain (better performance with less time cost).
One limitation of this study is that measures for the timing when students do their
homework are coarse. Normalized start/do/finish early are the date they first look at the
homework, the maximum entries into the homework, and the submission date of the home-
work. Although do/finish early can serve as proxies of when students did their homework,
we still do not know exactly when it happened. Further accuracy of the timing could
possibly be obtained with more information from the online tracking system.
There are possible limitations of this study. In the within-subject analysis, if a student
starts/does/submits an assignment early because he/she feels unfamiliar with the material
that week, the time cost may be high and the performance may still be low. In order to
test the validity of this concern, we need information on the prior knowledge of a student
to the content of each homework. A quiz or a survey at the beginning of a semester would
provide us with such information.
Another confound is if a student starts/does/submits a homework assignment early
because he/she is busy that week and has to work that way to get around the schedule.
An easy way to obtain information to test this concern is to add an additional question
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into each homework about how busy they are this week.
Granted, it is hard to find the right balance of procrastination and calculating the
optimal timing of work. So when is not too early nor too late? This study cannot answer
this question. Possible intervention and study to improve learning and work efficiency and
to find out the optimal timing calculation algorithm would be sending text messages or
other types of reminders to nudge people to work at different times, then evaluate their
efficiency, performance, and time costs.
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APPENDIX
A.1 APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
The original data sets for 2005-2008 and 2006-2009 cohorts were in two pieces and for
2007-2010 and 2008-2011 cohorts were in three pieces, with the information and number
of observations listed in the following table. Note that lottery data set B and junior high
graduation data set C contain information of all students in the city, while primary school
scores in data set A for 2007-2010 cohort is only for one district and 2008-2011 cohort for
two districts, one of which is the same as 2007-2010 cohort.
For the composition analysis, I merge data set A and B for 2007-2010 and 2008-2011
cohort for one shared district. Since there is not much time lag between when A and
B were collected, i.e. when students graduated from elementary school, the matching
rates are high. I only drop few duplicates and the matching rate is around 95%. The
unmatched may move to another city or because of mis-typed names that cannot identify
by pronunciation of names.
For the instrumental QTE analysis, I merge data set B and C for three cohorts using
name, gender, birth date and middle school, the linkage rate is lower. Possible reasons
include mis-typed names, incomplete information on birth date, noncompliance of the
lottery assignment and transfer. In order to link as many students’ record as possible, I
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gradually relax the criteria of matching.
After each stage, I take out the matched observations and use the remaining unmatched
observations in both data sets to do the next stage of matching. Stage 1 gives us the
most reliable matches. Stage 2 captures people whose names were mistyped. Stage 3
captures people whose birth date information is inaccurate. Stage 4 and 5 captures students
transferred to another middle school. 1 In total, the matching rate is around 80%.
1We would expect that the transferred middle school should be, on average, of higher quality than the
original one. There are of course other reasons causing transfer, such as moving and transferring to school
closer to home.
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Table A1: Description of Data Sets
Cohort 2007-2010
Data Set A: One district 6th
grade scores
Name, elementary school, 6th grade Chinese, math scores
Data Set B: City lottery record Name, elementary school, gender, birth date, class, admission chan-
nel, lottery choice and outcome, middle school admitted, parents’
political status, hukou, parents’ occupation, address, hometown,
ethnicity, political status
Data Set C: City 9th grade record Name, gender, birth date, middle school attended, middle school
graduation score, high school admitted.
Cohort 2006-2009
Data Set B: City lottery record Name, elementary school, gender, birth date, class, admission chan-
nel, lottery choice and outcome, middle school admitted, hukou,
address, hometown, ethnicity
Data Set C: City 9th grade record Name, gender, birth date, middle school attended, middle school
graduation score, high school admitted.
Cohort 2005-2008
Data Set B: City lottery record Name, elementary school, gender, admission channel, lottery choice
and outcome, middle school admitted
Data Set C: City 9th grade record Name, gender, birth date, middle school attended, middle school
graduation score.
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The following three tables present us with the descriptive statistics of the data for three
cohorts: 2005-2008, 2006-2009 and 2007-2010. I divide all students into three groups:
pre-admitted, noncompetitive lottery takers and competitive lottery takers. As we can
see, pre-admitted students have higher middle school graduation scores and better family
background (in terms of father and mother political status and hukou possession 2, attend
better schools and get higher scores in junior high graduation exams.
Table A2: Individual Level Data: Summary Statistics 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All policy preadmission lottery lottery&policy lottery&nonpolicy
9th grade score 22.39 20.79 24.61 20.58 19.80 20.72
Non-academic Evaluation 13.20 12.89 13.80 12.77 12.83 12.76
Higher than 90 percentile 0.442 0.0582 0.464 0.388 0.0531 0.0632
Normalized 9th grade score 0.746 0.693 0.820 0.686 0.660 0.691
Normalized Non-academic Evaluation 0.825 0.806 0.862 0.798 0.802 0.798
female 0.475 0.469 0.477 0.457 0.463 0.456
transfer 0.200 0.220 0.0730 0.371 0.369 0.372
policy 0.0994 1 0.00608 0.155 1 0
preadmission 0.385 0.0264 1 0 0 0
lottery 0.240 0.365 0 1 1 1
winlottery 0.480 0.399 0.480 0.399 0.494
obs 12,964 1,289 7,467 4,653 471 2,563
Note: Column 2 describes policy school students, column 3 describes students who were pre-admitted,
column 4 describes students who chose an over-subscribed school and assigned by lottery; column 5 describes
students who were assigned by lottery to a policy school; column 6 describes students who were assigned by
lottery to a non-policy school. Non-academic evaluation is consist of teacher and self-rated measures of four
abilities, including civics, learning ability, atheistic ability, and practical ability.
2Hukou equals to 1 if the student has the residency record of Changsha. In China, residency record
is very important because it gives you access to many benefits in the city, including health care, pension
insurance and employment advantages.
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Table A3: Individual Level Data: Summary Statistics 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All policy preadmission lottery lottery&policy lottery&nonpolicy
9th grade score 22.67 21.68 24.57 21.75 21.90 21.72
Normalized 9th grade score 0.756 0.723 0.819 0.725 0.730 0.724
Academic high school 0.837 0.760 0.951 0.785 0.786 0.785
Elite high school 0.369 0.295 0.575 0.224 0.288 0.208
Non-academic Evaluation 14.59 14.11 15.11 14.37 14.22 14.41
Normalized Non-academic Evaluation 0.912 0.882 0.945 0.898 0.888 0.901
Imputed 9th grade score 22.72 22.06 24.57 21.85 22.23 21.75
female 0.469 0.456 0.489 0.460 0.461 0.460
hukou 0.778 0.754 0.862 0.776 0.752 0.784
missing hukou 0.174 0.0355 0.233 0.103 0.0383 0.121
preadmission 0.387 0.000480 1 0 0 0
policy 0.125 1 0.000155 0.220 1 0
winlottery 0.546 0.197 0.546 0.197 0.645
transfer 0.0910 0.101 0.0881 0.0852 0.120 0.0755
obs 16,665 2,082 6,446 5,694 1,254 4,440
Note: Column 2 describes policy school students, column 3 describes students who were pre-admitted,
column 4 describes students who chose an over-subscribed school and assigned by lottery; column 5 describes
students who were assigned by lottery to a policy school; column 6 describes students who were assigned
by lottery to a non-policy school. % academic high school indicates the percentage of 9th grade graduates
attending an academic high school; some other graduates attend vocational schools or stop schooling. Non-
academic evaluation is consist of teacher and self-rated measures of four abilities, including civics, learning
ability, atheistic ability, and practical ability. Imputed 9th grade score is constructed by assigning the highest
grade of their cohort to the missing grade of direct admitted students who did not take the exam. Having
city hukou means that a student is born in city and enjoys the public goods of that city; it is often used as
a measure of socioeconomic background.
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Table A4: Falsification Test for Treatment Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Depend.Variable Normalized 9th grade score Normalized school ranking % elite high school
Panel A. All Schools
postXlow-performing 0.0734 -0.0311 0.0883*** 0.0393 0.0185 0.0171
(0.0957) (0.0873) (0.0309) (0.0282) (0.0161) (0.0151)
Observations 441 441 441 441 441 441
R-squared 0.062 0.006 0.071 0.010 0.130 0.027
Number of schools 80 80 80 80 80 80
Panel B. Balanced sample
postXlow-performing -0.0183 -0.156 0.0540 -0.00873 -0.0101 -0.0113
(0.156) (0.145) (0.0501) (0.0465) (0.0269) (0.0255)
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160
R-squared 0.158 0.022 0.143 0.006 0.217 0.056
Number of schools 20 20 20 20 20 20
School FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y N Y N Y N
Time Trend N Y N Y N Y
This table reports falsification check for treatment effects. Instead of estimating treatment effects on
policy schools reported in Table 1.4, it tests whether the post-2007 improvement holds true for any
low-performing school. Each cell reports the coefficient of “postXlow-performing”, which equals to
1 for low-performing schools (defined by below average in 2004) after 2007. The sample ranges from
2004 to 2011 and drops all the policy schools. Each column has dependent variable listed on top
row and control variables indicated at the bottom three rows. Panel B takes schools with observed
performance in all eight years.Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level indicated by ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A.2 APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
Table A5: Balance Check for the Whole Sample
Control Treatment Stat. Sig.
mean s.d. Mean s.d. Different?
Class size
Average class size 36.5 4.48 40.5 2.66 Y
Personal Characteristics
Female percentage 0.47 0.5 0.51 0.5
Baseline Std Math
Grade 7 -0.08 0.9 0.13 0.91 Y
Grade 8 -0.24 1.13 0.13 1.03 Y
Baseline MHT 38.09 14.37 39.46 13.52
Family Characteristics
Father’s education 2.14 1.04 2.12 1.03
Mother’s education 1.75 0.96 1.8 0.97
Family size 4.76 1.12 4.81 1.2
Boarding roommate 6.01 3.79 5.54 4.47
Study attitude
like school (1-10) 7.639 2.805 7.36 2.691
class participation 5.806 6.299 4.286 5.373
ask questions 2.426 0.541 2.459 0.532
self read 2.366 0.595 2.244 0.534
extra exercise 2.106 0.634 2.074 0.485
Class leader 1.347 0.477 1.384 0.487
MHT subcategory scores
Learning stress 8.81 2.99 8.44 3.12
Social stress 3.92 2.35 4.36 2.3
Anti-social 2.82 2.18 2.84 2.09
Self-guilty 5.43 2.51 5.43 2.39
Over-sensitive 5.4 2.2 5.85 2.06
Physical-signs 5.49 2.89 5.46 2.81
fear 3.98 2.73 3.96 2.74
impulsiveness 3.1 2.47 3.24 2.19
Non-academic Behavior
bullied 1.574 0.724 1.541 0.657
argument 2.741 4.862 1.855 2.708 Y
fight 1.065 2.496 0.694 1.413 Y
Late hw 1.597 0.905 1.707 0.956
Late for class 1.458 0.681 1.426 0.615
absence 1.727 0.712 1.777 0.778
Note: First three columns takes the lower half performing students based on baseline math score in the control classes
as the control group for mentees. Similarly for mentors. “Control” and “Treatment” column show the means and
standard deviations in parentheses. “Stat. sig. diff?” column indicates whether the control and treatment group has
statistically significantly different characteristics.
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Table A6: Balance Check for Mentor/Mentee Subsamples
Mentee Mentor
Control Treatment Diff Control Treatment Diff
family size 4.718 4.726 0.00786 4.818 4.907 0.0886
(1.089) (1.129) (0.143) (1.155) (1.268) (0.165)
boarding length (year) 2.479 2.507 0.0279 2.328 2.156 -0.172
(2.286) (2.120) (0.285) (2.129) (1.974) (0.281)
# boarding roommates 6.393 5.702 -0.692 5.556 5.377 -0.178
(3.893) (4.277) (0.526) (3.643) (4.684) (0.566)
class participation 5.017 3.605 -1.412*** 6.737 5.009 -1.729*
(4.657) (2.686) (0.494) (7.731) (7.146) (1.020)
ask question 2.385 2.484 0.0993 2.475 2.432 -0.0425
(0.539) (0.518) (0.0681) (0.541) (0.547) (0.0741)
read 2.342 2.266 -0.0758 2.394 2.220 -0.174**
(0.604) (0.543) (0.0741) (0.586) (0.525) (0.0762)
extra exercise 2.103 2 -0.103 2.111 2.153 0.0414
(0.662) (0.460) (0.0738) (0.604) (0.500) (0.0762)
bullied 1.615 1.669 0.0540 1.525 1.407 -0.118
(0.808) (0.707) (0.0980) (0.612) (0.573) (0.0810)
argument 3.325 1.847 -1.478** 2.051 1.864 -0.186
(6.270) (2.157) (0.611) (2.106) (3.197) (0.363)
fight 1.302 0.952 -0.350 0.788 0.424 -0.364*
(2.964) (1.701) (0.315) (1.774) (0.964) (0.199)
late homework 1.654 1.875 0.221 1.167 1.538 0.371
(3.090) (3.001) (0.336) (1.786) (2.375) (0.290)
late class 0.987 0.875 -0.112 1.071 0.996 -0.0749
(1.822) (1.561) (0.210) (1.736) (1.353) (0.195)
like school (1-10) 7.829 7.145 -0.684* 7.414 7.585 0.171
(2.922) (3.017) (0.383) (2.657) (2.292) (0.340)
Note: First three columns takes the lower half performing students based on baseline math score in the
control classes as the control group for mentees. Similarly for mentors. “Control” and “Treatment” column
show the means and standard deviations in parentheses. “Diff” column shows the difference and standard
errors in parentheses, with significance level indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A7: Main Results using the Pooled Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regression Model OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit
Dependent Variable
Post std
math
Diff std
math
Post mental
health
Diff mental
health
Dropout Dropout any
treat 0.191 0.0511 -1.611 -1.397 -0.456 -0.386
(0.154) (0.135) (1.363) (1.432) (0.294) (0.285)
grade8 -0.0587 -0.0245 -2.064 -2.207 0.253 0.320
(0.180) (0.102) (1.452) (1.537) (0.280) (0.287)
female -0.0547 -0.0260 0.104 1.421 -0.164 -0.157
(0.112) (0.129) (0.740) (1.177) (0.245) (0.144)
Base std math 0.457***
(0.000)
Base mental health 0.766***
(0.000)
Observations 433 433 390 390 457 457
R-squared 0.22 0.001 0.536 0.023
Significance level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns (1)-(4) are OLS regression results with
robust standard errors corrected for small number of clusters using wild cluster bootstrapping with
1000 replications in parentheses. (5)-(6) are probit regression results with robust standard errors
clustered at class level in parentheses.
Standardized Math Score has a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 for each grade in each exam.
Mental health score is calculated according to a 100 question survey, with higher score being better
mental health condition. Dropout in column (5) equals to 1 if we know a student dropped out of
school. The dependent variable dropout any in column (6) equals to 1 if a student dropped out or
if he/she is missing from our sample without knowing the reason.
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Table A8: Heterogeneous Treatment Effect for Different Grade and Gender
Panel A: Mentee and Placebo Mentee Subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES post std math score post mental health
treat -0.181 -0.0374 -3.423* -4.867
(0.175) (0.0802) (1.795) (3.251)
female -0.0130 0.0209 0.613 0.801
(0.162) (0.117) (1.366) (0.966)
grade8 -0.0455 0.0654 -1.693 -3.483
(0.123) (0.197) (1.530) (2.422)
treat X female 0.0695 0.560
(0.233) (2.404)
treat X grade 8 -0.221 3.523
(0.318) (2.510)
Baseline Control Y Y Y Y
Observations 224 224 200 200
R-squared 0.079 0.083 0.499 0.501
Panel B: Mentor and Placebo Mentor Subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES post std math score post mental health
treat 0.451 0.239 1.272 0.120
(0.309) (0.234) (1.452) (4.340)
female -0.273 -0.140 0.901 -0.691
(0.237) (0.138) (2.057) (1.640)
grade8 -0.112 -0.460 -2.694 -2.451
(0.263) (0.616) (1.873) (1.561)
treat X female 0.248 -2.897
(0.284) (2.730)
treat X grade 8 0.654 -0.496
(0.530) (4.585)
Baseline Control Y Y Y Y
Observations 209 209 190 190
R-squared 0.173 0.195 0.593 0.59
Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for small number of
clusters using wild cluster bootstrapping with 1000 replications. Sig-
nificance level indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel A
takes the subsamples of mentees in the treatment group and the lower
half performing students (based on baseline math score) in the control
group. Similarly for Panel B. Each regression includes baseline control
of the outcome variables.
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Table A9: Student Suggestions
Category Detail # stu. response
Organization and arrangement 57
more time/frequency 20
more contact 10
fix time of the day to do peer mentoring 8
seat together 7
more monitoring 5
more friend conversations 3
separate study & non-study students 2
fix subject for each day 2
Matching mechanism 46
More ppl in a group (esp. 4 ppl group) 22
Self-choice pair 10
Top-down pair 8
Top-top pair 3
Mix gender group 3
Incentive methods 18
More prize for academic improvement/excellence 11
No snack or change snack to other prizes (pen, book) 7
No Change/ No Suggestion 53
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